

GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT: DIFFERENT PEOPLE, SAME MARKET AND GLORIFICATION OF POVERTY

Introduction

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 Hon. Commissioners and Members of State Houses of Assembly
 My Lords Spiritual and Temporal
 His Royal Highnesses here Present (Royal Fathers)
 Chiefs, Elders and Traditional Prime Ministers
 Gentlemen from the 4th Estate of the Realm
 Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen
 Great Loins and Lionesses

It is with the greatest humility and reverence to the Almighty God that I stand before this most distinguished audience today to do a reflective, inclusive and critical appraisal of my noble academic accomplishments in the field of Political Science. My discipline has remained fundamentally the most abused in the sense that virtually **everybody appears to agree to misunderstand what we do; how we do it and why we do what we do.** Therefore, by misunderstanding and misapplying the popular dictum: “man is a political animal”, most people wittingly and unwittingly award themselves degrees and diplomas in Political Science and yet remain non-professionals in the field they know virtually nothing about the precepts. Nonetheless, we shall continue to welcome more “pretenders to the throne” who only succeed in making themselves “free specimen” for advancing empirical studies within the discipline.

As a living, dynamic and ubiquitous discipline, Political Science has various strands, networks and inter-disciplinary frameworks which interrelate to dissect man, society and political processes. Ladies and gentlemen, I stand on this podium at Princesses Alexandria Auditorium before you today to extend frontiers of knowledge in this great discipline (Political Science) with special emphasis on **International Political Economy**.

Ladies and gentlemen, kindly permit me also to inform us that I am the 15th inaugural lecturer in the Faculty of the Social Sciences. Therefore, I draw particular inspiration and pay glowing tributes to the previous inaugural lecturers from my great Faculty and particularly from the Department of Political Science. I therefore warmly welcome you, my distinguished audience, to this intellectual harvest of our time. It remains a product of several years of research rooted in the Hegelian treatise of **thesis, antithesis and synthesis**. The goal remains to elicit further intellectual discourse and enquiry in the problematiques of the discipline. These modest contributions made it possible for this great University to promote me to the rank of Professor. We shall now turn our attention to the message of the day.

Man is evolutionary as well as transitional species that traverses from embryonic cells through splashing and clashing *civilizations* unto the path of fluid coalescence, *tolerance, intolerance and* clash of emotions, interests and desires. As a wanderer, gatherer and *enigmatic species*, man *consciously* and unconsciously sojourns through this imperfect world of appearances unto different directions in search of life, relevance, dignity, domination, peace, trouble/crisis, treasure and indeed in search of a superior being that holds the key to self-actualization, preservation and extension.

The imports of the above philosophical extractions are that:

- man is a dynamic being, constantly driven by the search for the primary need of stomach infrastructure;
- man naturally desires to survive, eke out a living and satisfy the innate expansive instincts;
- man is a bundle of contradictions who desires to remain and dominate the *civitas terena* and at the same time wants to secure a ticket to *civitas dei*;
- man is a reservoir of cognitive dissonance-both the spirit and the flesh are constantly revolting; and quite often desiring different and clashing needs; and
- man is enigmatic and driven by passion to produce his material existence; this passion, *tainted* in self-adulation, drive, expansion, extension, naturally **smacks** off conflicts of interests; and if not properly harmonized and reconciled reproduces *crises* situations.

The abstractions above, which are not mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, are largely *reflections* of existential conditions, including societal norms and values. Thus, man's attributes are products of existing values and likewise these acquired values intermesh with innately engrained values to define existential order.

As a corollary to the above, aggregate of men form clans, hamlets, villages, towns, states and the largest socio-formations (the international space). Indeed, existing polities are products of man's ideas, ingenuities, idiosyncratic dispositions, ideals, motivations, preferment and material values. Therefore, we can conveniently infer from the foregoing that distinct socio-formations reflect the following:

- level of development of the productive forces within the polity;
 - intensity and level of social atomization;
 - level of development of cultural secularization;
 - features and patterns of production and reward system;
 - response set of the critical actors to decisions of the state;
 - level of dexterity in the manipulation of "deceit" template;
 - relative number/profundity of political leaders with deep-rooted *melancholic* residues;
 - elasticity of social stratification index;
 - relative number of need-saddled citizens and number of people with psychopathic traits;
- and

- the level of fluidity, content and manipulation of information loop/networks.

Indeed the afore-stated contraptions are products of man, working in concert with critical *cosmic/ecological* factors. **Therefore, weighed on the scale man remains an indispensable and critical factor in societal transmogrification and/or decapitulation.** In fact, human factor outweighs non-human ingredients in the shaping of the political system and remains ultimately the chief decisive factor in the formation and development of the political system. **The above remains axiomatic.**

Arising from the above, the lecture conveniently states as follows:

- Every society is a product of the reasoning and motivations of the **critical people** that constitute it.
- Every polity reflects and manifests man's quest to exist, inter-relate, tolerate and accommodate.
- Every polity is a product of constant harmonization, trade-off and super-imposition of few interests on the majority.
- Development is a product of sound, sustained and cogent planning and administration of *curative* pills purchased at genuine market and attuned to the needs of the targets.
- Underdevelopment conversely is likened to the blind, chaotic and unregulated administration of curative pills purchased for cancer patients and wrongly administered to malaria patients. The consequences of adverse reactions of these drugs are better imagined.

The analysis above can be conducted to unveil the lots of global political economy. It is likened to an arena of splashing, clashing and revolving interests where different people converge to buy and sell with a currency *specific to specified items*. Ironically, the global political economy is indeed like an open market, presumably dealing with all products, but practically dwelling on specialized products for few specialists from advanced capitalist economies, with clear-cut ideology. These sophisticated economies deploy their high sense of vision, planning, deceit and covert coercion to attract ideologically-impaired and disparaged nationals from developing economies to come and buy items they do not have the need for.

People that initiate and control the currency and produce the specific items for sale paradoxically made it inevitable that all, with distinct needs, must key into the contrived and imposed currency which commands specified alien commodity. Hence, distinct people are compelled to buy what they do not need and to acquire **branded currency** that limits their choices and flexibility of action. Thus, most developing economies are left constantly on the throes of self-delusion *all in the names of interdependency and globalization, openness, good ally, diplomatic relations, universal practice, friendly relations and development and democracy*. Of course, the end result remains repudiation of one's state of existence; emasculation and amputation of natural development trends and hence acceptance of poverty, malnourishment and penury as the development telos for peripheral capitalist socio-formations. Among others, the lecture shall pursue the thesis that *the blind, chaotic and sustained rejection of naturally-prescribed development path by successive political leaderships in peripheral socio-formations and the wholesale acceptance of the dictates of merchants of global political economy that compel all to purchase same items of trade in the midst of varying, splashing and clashing needs, tendentiously reproducing underdevelopment, insecurity and proliferation of need-saddled citizenry in developing economies*. The lecture is divided into the following themes:

- ◆ Global Political Economy
- ◆ Theoretical explanations of development and underdevelopment
- ◆ State: critical theories and applications
- ◆ International trade practices and underdevelopment
- ◆ Interpretations and Prognosis
- ◆ Facts of the matter
- ◆ Concluding Remarks/Appreciations

Global Political Economy

The world of man is cast in globe-like cells, enamored in integrative and counteracting social relations. It is indeed a system, a world system that has traversed from pockets of

communities, aggregated into chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires and currently propelled by the state system. According to Wallenstein (1974:347):

A world system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension, and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage.

As a world system of state, driven by extensive division of labour, interests, competition, domination and subordination, the globe currently ravaged by globalization precepts largely moves under the hydra-headed fulcrum of advanced western capitalism. This unique capitalism is regulated by the ideals, aggregated idiosyncrasies, motivations and preference of select **international persons** who align with their respective high profile home states to enunciate and propel the contemporary global practices, as foisted in the “dos and don’ts”; including the structures of international relations, content and patterns of global interdependence and strategic relevance and irrelevance of the constituent states.

As a corollary of the above and in further amplification of the view earlier canvassed, Wallenstein (1974:349) aptly noted as follows:

...the range of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout the world system. In part, this is the consequence of ecological considerations, to be sure. But for the most part, it is a function of the social organization of work, one which magnifies and legitimizes the ability of some groups within the system to exploit the labour of others, that is, to receive a larger share of the surplus.

Indeed, further appreciation of the above analysis shall be enhanced if we take a brief intellectual excursion into the meaning of the term ‘political economy’. Basically political economy refers to a multidisciplinary social science doctrine which fundamentally deals with the laws, processes and structure of the production and distribution/ exchange of material values in a given polity.

As clearly noted by Nikitin (1983:24):

Political economy is a science of the development of socio-production, i.e. economic relations between people. It clarifies the laws governing production, distribution, exchange and consumption of the material wealth in human society at various stages of its development.

At international level, Veseth (nd: 1) noted as follows:

International Political Economy (IPE) is the rapidly developing social science field of study that attempts to understand international and global problems using an eclectic interdisciplinary array of analytical tools and theoretical perspectives. IPE is a field that thrives on the process that Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction." The growing prominence of IPE as a field of study is in part a result of the continuing breakdown of disciplinary boundaries between economics and politics in particular and among the social sciences generally. Increasingly, the most pressing and interesting problems are those that can best be understood from a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, or trans-disciplinary point of view. If there is an "IPE Project", its objective is to pull down the fences that restrict intellectual inquiry in the social sciences so that important questions and problems can be examined without reference to disciplinary borders.

Veseth (nd:1) also stated that IPE is the study of a *problématique*, or set of related problems. The traditional IPE *problématique* includes analysis of the political economy of international trade, international finance, North-South relations, multinational corporations, and hegemony. This *problématique* has been broadened in recent years as many scholars have sought to establish a New IPE that is less centred on International Politics and the problems of the nation-state and less focused on economic policy issues. These scholars seek to create a new discipline of IPE that would transcend the perceived limits of international politics and international economics as fields of study and research.

Meanwhile, the classical political economy approach among whose major proponents are Petty (1623-1687); Smith (1723-1790); Ricardo (1772-1823); Malthus (1766-1834) and Karl Marx (1818-1883) provided both the framework and analyses of the dynamism of the emerging capitalist society. Meanwhile, classical political economists could be analytically classified into

two basic orientation groups viz: liberal/neo-liberal and Marxist/neo-Marxist groups. Attempt by Gilpin (1995:241-258) to classify ideologies of political economy into the liberal, nationalist and Marxist perspectives introduces even greater confusion/distortion and exposes his seemingly **lack of appreciation of history in the development of capitalism.**

Indeed, classical Marxian analysis conceives political economy in terms of the laws governing the production and distribution of the material means of subsistence in human society at various stages of its development (Nikitin, 1983; Marx and Engels, 1975). Basically, the proponents focused on the linkage network between the economy and the political affairs. Marxian scholarship fills this gap and indeed focuses on the social structure of society. More importantly, the method of analysis is **dialectical materialism**. Following Ake (1981:1-5), we outline the basic propositions of dialectical materialism thus:

- ◆The primacy of material conditions
- ◆The dynamic character of reality
- ◆The relatedness of different elements of society

However, the emphasis on determinism as underlying defining variable on sub-structural and super-structural inter-relations introduces analytical difficulties. I therefore treated the economy and the political, especially as they concern developing economies, as complementary aggregates that continue to exert remarkable influence on each other. None determines the character of the other, but “both continuously reinforce the intensity of each other’s linkages and adjust existing structures and conditions to suit directional policy goals” (Okolie, 2010a:133). Of course, this difficult and perhaps controversial conclusion is born out of my conviction that there is a positive relationship between the existence of powerful individuals and prevalence of weak institutions in developing economies.

As a corollary to the above, Marxian political economy approach integrates analysis of domestic productive structure and relations into the international structure and transactions (Ake, 1981; Lenin, 1976; Dobb (ed.), 1970). The approach also analyses relations among states and the international conditions of production, including international division of labour, international exchange, world market and crises. It is based on the foregoing that any meaningful and realistic analysis of inter- and intra-state relations must take into cognizance the interplay of the political and economic appendages as interactive, integrative and sometimes counteractive phenomena. Hence, it is a truism to state that “*the environment which shapes the character and behaviour of states must also be understood in global terms and with respect to both economic and political phenomena*” (Moon, 1991:36).

Meanwhile, global political economy is a synonym of international political economy. It refers to “the study of these international problems and issues that cannot adequately be addressed by recourse to domestic economic, political and sociological analysis alone” (Balaam & Veseth, 2005:3). Moreover, they remark that “it is the study of international affairs that focuses on the elements of complex interdependence that define many of our most pressing problems today (Balaam & Veseth, 2005:3).

Therefore, the complexity of the global political economy and inexplicable differential resource endowments further underscored the need for interdependence so as to maximize the gains inherent in exploring the precepts of comparative advantage matrix. Thus, Jackson and Sorensen (2007:2) vividly amplified this complexity when they noted that:

States are independent of each other, at least legally: they have sovereignty. But that does not mean that they are isolated or insulated from each other. On the contrary they adjoin each other and affect each other and must therefore somehow find ways to coexist and to deal with each other... states

are usually embedded in international market which affect these policies of their governments and the interests and welfares of their citizens’.

The above clearly resonates the rationale and *raison d’être* behind the articulation of world system theory, as well as the theory of complex interdependence. The latter theory was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Their initial assumption is that in the era of interdependence the very nature of international relations is changing. Therefore, the world has become more interdependent in economics, communication and human aspirations. According to them, complex interdependence refers to the various complex transnational connections (interdependencies) between states and societies. The theory does not see one country as being perpetually dependent on another, but that all countries share in a complex web of interconnectedness and interdependence.

To summarize, Keohane and Nye (2001) defined complex interdependence according to three characteristics, as follows:

- the actors are states and non-state actors with multiple channels of communication at interstate, trans-governmental and trans-national levels;
- the agenda of interstate relationships comprises multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy; in other words, there are multiple issues with no hierarchy; military security does not consistently dominate the agenda; and
- military force plays a relatively minor role in international relations mainly because “it is not used by government towards other governments within the region, or on the issue when complex interdependence prevails.

Meanwhile, Okolie (2006:75) remarked that “the complex interdependence theory enhances appreciation of cooperative actions among states and facilitates deep understanding of global patterns of inter-relationship”. In fact, interdependence theorists noted that such relations, particularly economic ones, were increasing; while the use of military force and

power balancing were decreasing (but remained important). As stated in *International Relations Paradigms, Approaches and Theories* (2005), the decline of military force as a policy tool and increase in economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states. Perhaps in anticipation of problems of unequal gains raised by realists, the theorist introduced the concept of 'regimes' to mitigate anarchy and enhance mutual cooperation.

Indeed, the theory enhances appreciations of cooperative actions among states and facilitates deep understanding of global pattern of interrelationship. It recognizes the possibilities of exploitation and lopsided benefits and hence places emphasis on global regimes as effective mechanisms for redressing such situations. While appreciating the veracity and import of the analysis, it is important that this global regime must have as its cardinal principles mutual respect, equity, fairness and respect for independent action, as frameworks for stimulating development of states and her nationals.

Development and Underdevelopment: Theoretical Expositions and Praxis

Development is a term that suffers from problems of definition. Hence, it assumes vastly different meanings to many scholars and political actors whose appreciation and application of the term reflect and manifest their distinct and diversifying methodological, epistemological and material foundations and twists. In fact, so confused had the situation become that Dudley Seers (1964:3-4) wondered "whether instead of worrying about brushing aside the web of fantasy and shipshoddedness surrounding the word 'development', we should not simply abolish its use and look for a better and less debased word". However, he proposed a redefinition of the term.

Meanwhile, in appreciation of the term and the complexities weaved around it, one of the most acceptable authorities in political economy, Gerald Meier, had argued that it is pointless defining development. He emphasized that it is more appropriate to state what development is not. According to him, development is not the same thing as economic independence; and also economic development should not be equated with national industrialization. He also remarked that the predominance of agriculture in developing economies should not be interpreted to mean that it is the cause of poverty. Moreover, he noted that mere increase in the country's gross national product does not automatically translate to economic development. Again he remarked that national development should be distinguished from economic development because the latter is a part of the former. He therefore defined economic development as the process whereby the real per capita income of a country increases over a long period of time – subject to the stipulations that the number of people below an 'absolute poverty line' does not increase, and that the distribution of income does not become more unequal (Meier & Rauch, 2005:1).

Generally, development is often used to describe the process of economic and social transformation within countries. This process often follows a well-ordered sequence and exhibits common characteristics across countries. Meanwhile, Todaro (1992) perceived development as a multi-dimensional process involving the re-organization and re-orientation of entire economic and social systems. He maintained that development must represent the entire gamut of changes by which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory and towards a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually better. Nevertheless, Todaro's analysis underplayed the vital role played by human factors and

the processes through which development is actualized and sustained. However, his analysis was anchored on immeasurable situational factors.

Perhaps, a much more concrete analysis was that adduced by Seers. He succinctly noted that:

The questions to ask about a country's development are three: what has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all these three have declined from high levels then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned (Seers, 1964:3)

Subsequently, Seers (1977: 5) added "self-reliance" as one of the cardinal ingredients of development. He, nonetheless, failed to provide measurement instruments and/or criteria for the prescribed cardinal ingredients of development and, like most writers, glossed over the role of human factors in the process of development.

In fact, Cairncross (1961:250) correctly observed that "the key to development lies in men's minds, in the institutions in which their thinking finds expression and in the play of opportunities on ideas and institutions". Therefore, development embraces the major economic and social objectives and values that societies strive for. Thus Guolet (1971) and Thirlwall (1989) argued that development occurs when there are improvements in life sustenance, self-esteem and freedom and when material advancement has expanded the range of choice for individuals. In the same vein, Mabogunje (1981) underscored the primacy of human factors in development. He noted, among others, that development is essentially a human issue, a concern with the capacity of individuals to realize their inherent potential and effectively cope with the changing circumstances of their lives. He also noted that development involves the total and full mobilization of a society towards a self-centred and self-reliant position with regard not only to

the processes of decision-making, but more importantly the pattern and style of production and consumption.

Meanwhile, social science literature is inundated with writings, which conceive development in terms of economic growth and modernization. Specifically, western-oriented scholars encourage underdeveloped states to model their societies in line with the institutional and structural arrangements and orientations reminiscent of advanced capitalist states. These scholars include Rostow (1960), Huntington (1965), Pye (1966) and Coleman (1968). They churn out a checklist of artifacts which they perceive as indicators of development: these include industrialization, economic affluence, military hegemony, advanced technology, urbanization and the parliamentary political process (Nnoli, 1981).

However, Frank (1969), Amin (1973), Baran (1967), Ake (1981), Nnoli (1981), Gana (1989) etc. have in their separate contributions unleashed a deserved and unmitigated critique of the modernization thesis. They, among others, stated that the modernization persuasion abstracted from history and concluded by presenting logically inconsistent analysis. Hence, their suggestions and prescriptions are not only theoretically inadequate, but empirically untenable and policy-wise ineffective.

In particular, Ake (1972), Rodney (1902) and Nnoli (1981) observed that development is multi-faceted and man-centred. It derives from the material conditions of the people concerned and hence it is neither imposed nor hoisted. In fact, Ake warned that “development that commits us to a wholesale imitation of others leads to a wholesale repudiation of state of being” (Ake, 1972). Similarly, Nnoli (1981) conceives development as a ‘dialectical phenomenon in which the individual and society interact with their physical, biological and inter-human environments transforming them for their own betterment and that of humanity at large and being transformed

in the process". The above conceptualizations appear comprehensive but were not anchored on something concrete, precise and measurable.

Development should better be perceived as man-directed, phenomenal, socio-economic and political transformations of self and entire structure of a given political system. These involve acquisition of new and relevant ideas, skills, drive, propensities, preferences and predispositions which are directed towards improvement of the living conditions and material existence of the concerned population. The above subsequently translate into improvement in man's potentials and capabilities; elimination or rather reduction of poverty, inequality, unemployment and thus improvement in life sustenance, self-esteem, freedom and value orientations.

As a corollary to the above, development refers to anything that advances the individual improvement of skills, capacities and capabilities to serve as catalysts and harbingers for qualitative transformation of his or her immediate environment; a transformation of which the main purpose is simply to provide him or her in due course with a better environment and standard of living in economic or human terms. The development process must first and foremost make room for an awakening of the potentials of human beings who are both its initial protagonists and its ultimate target. The conceptualizations above will provide a good framework within which we can realistically put the underdeveloped countries back on the trajectory of societal transmogrification.

It is however pertinent to highlight that development has political, economic and social ramifications. It is a comprehensive and integrative phenomenon which **must** be appreciated as such and applied accordingly. Hitherto, liberal writers stated that economic development concentrates primarily on economic growth as reflected by increases in Gross National Product

(GNP), industrialization, capital formation, welfare services, the development of infrastructure such as roads, electricity and railways and increased economic efficiency. However, using GNP as a parameter for measuring levels of development is not only questionable but misleading. As Webster (1990:29) rightly observes, it does not account for activities like smuggling, domestic labourers, and network of families engaged in subsistence food production.

In fact, an analysis of economic development should concentrate on the process by which various economic activities appear, grow in importance and, in some cases, decline or disappear. Basically, literature on economic development has been dominated by three major strands of thought:

- i. the stages of economic growth of the 1950's and early 1960s;
- ii. the international dependency theories of the late 1960s and the 1970s; and
- iii. the free market theories of the 1980s, 1990s and beyond.

In the 1950s, development was conceptualized from the perceptive prism of the modernization persuasion. The modernization theory was the dominant mode of analysis and it attributes the causes of underdevelopment to factors *sui generis* and endogenous to the less developed countries. Thus, the theory advocates a total transformation of traditional or pre-modern entities, approximating the technologies and organization of the advanced capitalist societies.

The chief proponents who included Rostow (1960), Hoselitz (1971), McClelland (1971), and Hagen (1980) etc. compartmentalized the world into the traditional and modern societies. The former is seen as backward, primitive, and technologically deformed. They also argued that traditional societies are held down by certain inhibiting factors that usually undermine realistic and sustained economic development. On the other hand, they classified modern societies as the advanced capitalist societies that are technologically advanced, politically stable and governed

by pragmatism, universalism and oriented to development. Thus they encourage underdeveloped societies to imbibe imitative attitudes, and remodel their respective societies after the advanced capitalist societies.

However, the apparent failure of the modernization prescriptions to stimulate sustainable development led to the emergence of international dependence school of thought which incubated the dependency theory. The theory has Latin American origin. The movement emerged as a critique of modernization paradigm, especially as a critique of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) which failed to accomplish industrial development in Latin America.

The dependency paradigm attempts an understanding and explanation of socio-political and economic variables that re-enforce underdevelopment by focusing on the historical circumstances surrounding the underdeveloped countries. It argues among others that the conditions and circumstances of the Third World countries would be concretely appreciated if the experiences of the underdeveloped countries were examined in terms of the mode of their incorporation into the capitalist economy, their performance within it, and the mechanism for sustaining the conditions of underdevelopment. Notable among the proponents of the dependency paradigm are Baran (1967), Frank (1969), Santos (1970), Sunkel (1973), Furtado (1976) and Cardoso (nd). They accused modernization theorists of being inept, ahistorical and hence, guilty of these fallacies:

- The global marathon fallacy
- The original sin fallacy
- The frontier fallacy
- The capital shortage fallacy
- The charity fallacy
- The economic growth equals to social progress fallacy
- The dualism fallacy

Thus, the dependentistas perceive underdevelopment in terms of international and domestic power relationships, institutional and structural economic rigidities and the resulting proliferation of dual economies and dual societies both within and among the nations of the world. They maintain that the less developed countries could only develop if they repudiate western-oriented development strategies and simply adopt internally stimulated development strategies; simply put, if they first **delink**.

However, by emphasizing more of exogenous variables rather than the entire structure of the socio-economic system to explain underdevelopment and the dynamics of international political economy, the dependency theory presents a picture of absolute fatalism: condemning the underdeveloped countries to unalterable deteriorating position almost irreversibly determined by neocolonialism and offering no hope of escape from the stranglehold of underdevelopment. Moreover, by prescribing delinking as an alternative option for development, the dependentistas glossed over the internal conditions of the less developed countries, including the ecological and leadership factors which combine to constrain sustainable development.

Thus, in the 1980s through the new millennium, emphasis shifted to free markets and less government interventions in the economy, in order to promote competition and stimulate rapid growth and development. Through the much propagated and re-invigorated globalization and its processes, developing states are practically coerced into imbibing the market economy doctrine. Developing countries are inveigled into accepting and swallowing the pill of trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation etc. However, these have not put the economies of underdeveloped countries back on the trajectory of sustainable development. Instead, this new surge of world capitalism is introducing even greater distortions into the politics of developing states.

The above concretely demonstrates that the developing states have been wallowing from one developmental fad to another. This results basically from the different perceptions of development both as a fact-situation, and a process. Hence, in the attempt to grasp the substantive and methodological features of development and use same for public administration and as a basis for political action, successive political leaderships in developing countries adopt specific development models, ranging from the state-centric perspective to the model which emphasizes the expansion of the market from the domestic to the interdependent (Oliver, nd).

Nevertheless, the adoption of any of the models of development has not practically translated into remarkable development. Various explanations have been adduced for these. However, the explanations appear to melt under the boiling pot of the nature and character of international political economy which sustains an asymmetrical relationship between the developed and developing states.

While Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950), Haberler (1961) and Baldwin (1972) blamed underdevelopment on terms of trade, Okishio (1963) and Emmanuel (1992) anchored their explanations on unequal exchange. All these however centre on the nature and character of international trade. Nevertheless, the structuralists among whom is Rodriquez (1980) based their analysis on the structure of the mode of production. They criticized the conventional theory of international trade and maintain that the problem can be located on the international division of labour which they argue was of much greater benefit to the **centre** than the **periphery**. To break this yoke, the structuralists prescribe rapid and massive industrialization. Nonetheless, they gave no consideration to the social relations of production which are at the base of the process of ISI and of the transformation in other structures of society that this brings to its wake. This however

is not under-playing the fact that the international economic system is characterized by inequality and lop-sided development.

Arguing further on this, Nweke (1984) observed that underdevelopment is sustained by global inequality and distorted development. This he argued is a largely unavoidable consequence of their colonial past. This is not stating that colonialism is a singular cause of underdevelopment. Global inequality is a natural phenomenon. It is a consequence of differing levels of development of the productive forces in the constituting political units. **Hence, global equality negates the cosmic order.** Of course, uneven development is an intrinsic or inherent property of the economic process. Far from being merely transitory, “it seems to be a pervasive and permanent condition” (Harris, 1989: 335). The present economic configurations in the international economic relations are essentially a product of differential growth of the productive potentials and/or pattern of production.

The international economic order is analytically classified into two poles: the centre and the periphery. Although the classification is not mutually exclusive, the two poles are closely bound together and are mutually and reciprocally conditioning. Nevertheless, the periphery countries are subordinated by the international division of labour, to a status of ‘hewer of wood and drawer of water’. Remarkably, most of the undeveloped and underdeveloped countries come from Africa.

Underdevelopment Explained

Like development, underdevelopment is a term prone to various interpretations and applications. So politicized is the term that several development scholars, in attempts to provide empirical indices, become guilty of concept overstretching and quite often thrive on barefoot

empiricism and outlandish intellectual circumvention. While underscoring the above point, a classical writer on the subject remarks as follows:

The meaning of underdevelopment is further complicated when the term is applied to human as well as to natural resources. It has been objected to such an application that it is essential to distinguish between underdevelopment of natural resources and economic backwardness of populations, and that the problems of the so-called underdeveloped areas are, in fact, often associated with the latter rather than with the former condition (Myint, 1954:132-163).

In furtherance of the view expressed by Myint, Hazlewood (1964:733) remarked that “underdevelopment implies that the countries and areas to which it is applied are ‘poor’ because their resources are underdeveloped.” However, he failed to reveal the critical issues which are:

- Who pillaged and underdeveloped the resources?
- What processes/mechanisms were used to underdevelop these resources?
- What are the implications of this decapitulation of resources for sustainable human capacity transmutation?

For obvious reasons, most bourgeois and western-oriented scholars evaded answers to the above questions? Therefore, Rodney (1972:35) remarks that “underdevelopment is a paradox”. He raised some vital questions as to why many parts of the world that are naturally rich are actually poor and parts that are not so well off in wealth of soil and sub-soil are enjoying the highest standards of living. He therefore noted that “underdevelopment expresses a particular relationship of exploitation, namely the exploitation of one country by another” (Rodney, 1972:24).

However, in my various synoptic analyses of underdevelopment, I, *inter alia*, concluded as follows:

- Underdevelopment, like development, is a process.
- Underdevelopment is fundamentally externally-driven retrogression arising from monumental depletion and expropriation of natural resources of undeveloped economies.

- Underdevelopment is quite distinct from undevelopment; the latter is orchestrated by what can be described as inability or failure to make effective and judicious use of available resources by the nationals. It is an endogenous problem. Lack of appropriate skills, training and enlightenment *vis-à-vis* the existing natural resource potentials. Therefore, the available natural resources are left largely in their pure and unadulterated forms, untapped.
- Underdevelopment is largely externally-generated and sustained. It is a by-product of organic composition of capital arising from the growth, expansion and internal contradictions of Western capitalism/imperialism.
- As a corollary of the above, it results from adverse historic conditions, especially from political and socio-economic colonialism, enslavement and entrapment which kept developing economies aside from the rapidly growing global economy.

Some of the basic characteristics/traits of underdeveloped economies include:

- prevalence of strong/powerful individuals and weak/fledgling institutions;
- personalisation of state power;
- existence of unregulated securitization of politics and politicization of security;
- proliferation of need-saddled citizenry;
- existence of low reservoir of natural resources;
- low level of industrialization and growing de-industrialization;
- high un-employment, under-employment, disguised unemployment;
- low and depleting foreign exchange reserve ;
- adverse balance of trade and balance of payment conditions;
- heavy borrowing from other countries. Heavy outgoing resources towards debt-servicing;
- high dependency on foreign aids/grants;
- high susceptibility to external interference, control and unbridled manipulations ;
- revolving vicious circle of poverty;
- high elasticity of socio-economic inequality;
- inflation and constant devaluation of currency;
- budgetary deficit and deficit financing; as well as
- planning without execution.

Although the afore-stated characteristics are not mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, I have to emphasize that majority of the citizens living in the underdeveloped economies are subjected to excruciating and suffocating deprivations which ultimately impact their mentality and conditions them to manifest salient peasant traits. Thus in Okolie (2012a:41)

I outlined the following recurring traits of the emaciated and depraved citizens as follows:

- they are largely preoccupied with subsistence agriculture;
- their productive forces are largely undeveloped ;
- they live in squatter settlements and engage in community holdings;

- their level of social atomization is critically low and hence, people largely thrive on the principle of consanguinity with social support networks;
- they owe their cultural self-reproduction and survival to some overlords and religious contacts/overloads ;
- they are not materialistic inclined but **remain satisfied over nothing** as most of them owe one set of clothing, two at most;
- overall, the peasants are constantly locked in a complex web of alienation as they usually retain only 10-20% of their total work and earnings;
- they are often very loyal to intended power structures that define their rights and privileges and “protect” them from interlopers, despites their low status within these power structures;
- sometimes, they are conscious of their marginalization and exploitation, they may complain but their siege mentality discourage them from being proactive; and
- finally, peasants appear happy in the midst of the overwhelming and excruciating debilitating conditions.

As a corollary of the above, most underdeveloped economies can be likened to peasant societies which, as articulated in Okolie (2012a:42), manifests the following attributes:

- enforces equality of result rather than opportunities;
- believes in only limited goods. The more your neighbor earns, the less someone else gets;
- promotes envy rather than admiration of success among the citizens; hence, the more the poor earns, the more consolidated the jealousy of the relatively rich;
- emphasizes redistribution of wealth at the expense of creating further wealth;
- promotes climate of fear, suspicious and intolerance among the social forces;
- leaders create conditions for instability and political crises and turn back to adopt fire-bridged approach to “avert the implosion”;
- political leaders create conditions which compel the masses to preoccupy themselves with worshipping images, while the leaders cling on plundering social wealth;
- the masses are made to believe that profit is a sort of theft, and the people who create profit through hard work are constantly marked for destruction;
- the society creates condition for the masses to dream dreams that are far removed from existing objective conditions; they infest the society with the principle of hope; basically as strategy for promoting deceit and hallucination;
- they create artificial conditions that encourage the masses to worship the very people who obstruct their success and hence, recycle a bleak future; and
- finally, peasant societies create false consciousness, deceit and glorification of pyrrhic success. It creates unhealthy competition among the people, groups and institutions and equally implants self-defeat, falsehood and limited materialistic instincts within the polity;

I have to reiterate that the enunciated traits remain the guiding principles in peasant societies. These societies and the absurd practices reflect and define the attributes of the state in most developing economies. Meanwhile, several strands of thought exist in social science literature on the explanation of the development challenges facing peripheral capitalist economies. However, these scholarships are polarized on the endogenous and exogenous explanatory matrix. Besides, a few-half way houses exist on the subject matter. Meanwhile, general analysis on the subject points at the following as the root causes of underdevelopment in peripheral social formations: low need achievement, political corruption, low capital formation, failure of political leaderships, poor planning, colonial legacy, long absence of democracy etc.

In our separate studies, we outlined the fundamental catalysts that reproduce underdevelopment and hence, proliferate need-saddled citizenry. In Okolie and Ezeibe (2011:39-51) for instance, we noted that “most states in Africa lack the capacity to regulate social relations, initiate and sustain autonomous and autochthonous development conditions that can transmute the socio-formation out of the woods unto the trajectory of sustainable human capital development”. Similarly, I had noted that the persistence of low regulatory, extractive and administrative capacities of these states is caused by a combination and interplay of some basic factors which include:

- factors of colonialism and institutionalization of colonial extractive and distributive mentality;
- institutionalization of peasant mentality within the civil society;
- entrenchment of political alienation within the civil society;
- circulation of pacifist political leaderships who exhibit high level of psychological derailment and melancholy arising largely from high residues of incompetence and poverty of ideas;
- persistence of very low level of development of productive forces ;
- low permeation of cultural secularization and social atomization;
- prevalence of sharply dichotomized civil society of “we” and “they” and sustenance of weak institutions;

- persistence of hybrid political culture which favours expansion of “extractive feudalism” and “oligarchic communal order”;
- institutionalization of parasitic patrimonial order that is rooted in zero sum game; and
- circulation of political leaderships with pre-colonial “village headmaster” and “village head” mentality who appropriate and personalize political offices and conflate popular/majoritarian leadership with one-man-dictated rule (Okolie, 2010c:3-4).

Similarly, I appreciated the saliency of the capitalist mode of production and remarked however that within the framework of capitalism exist the contradictions of development of peripheral capitalist economies, and paradox of development. Thus, I noted that although capitalism has generated great wealth and knowledge unlike any other mode of social production hitherto known to man, it has also generated greater disparity, inequality, human suffering and misery as wealth and power are increasingly privatized. Therefore in an attempt to redress the orgy situation, Ogban- Iyam (2005:45) correctly noted that:

The current challenge to any modern polity is how to (1) adapt communal society production to the current large scale societies or polities or (2) how to transform a capitalist social labour to social products and no longer private product in which a majority rules or (3) to transform a socialist production system to a communal social production system in which a majority rules or (4) how to carry out a combination of 1 and 3 above where the majority are recessive and dominated by communal social production and minority of its citizens capitalist social production system

The above quotation suggests that developing economies are most fitted for the fourth category where both the communalism and capitalism are rife and interfacing. Therefore capitalism is dominant though not deeply rooted in these economies. Besides, popular communalism tainted in feudalism is dominating and pervasive, thereby debasing and vitiating efforts at implanting hegemonic capitalist ethos.

Based on the foregoing, I had earlier stated as follows:

- Developing economies are in a permanent status of economic disequilibrium arising largely from low production of material values and pursuit of policies aimed at instituting begger mentality and hopelessness.
- Following from the above, cultural securitization is deliberately mangled, disjointed and

tainted with intolerance and fear complex; this is largely because specific critical, cultural values are deployed as tools for perpetrating grandiose personal and group appropriation and expropriation.

- As a corollary, social atomization is regimented and attuned towards extensive selfish ends. This truncates efforts at national consciousness and puts the political economy of a nation within the throes of constant protection of ethnic/clannish identities/war lords.
- That rival groups namely – communalists and capitalists- are continuously struggling to capture, control and dominate the political economy.
- This struggle between these groups breeds policy inconsistencies and discourages diversification of the economy
- That low intensity of social production and reproduction, low material and mental capacity of the leadership impel them to rely on **received and prepared** development agenda which they are equally incompetent and ill-equipped to understand, interpret and implement.
- The existence of uncoordinated and inchoate economic structure is implicated in the persistence of over-bloated state structure which, in the midst of disjointed economic structure, rather serves as vehicle for advancing political patronage and resuscitating loyal but criminally-minded political surrogates.
- The existence of low productive potentials and competitiveness in the midst of liberalization project undermines the development of potent, internal markets and thus enhances the emergence of a group of individuals **who reify the State and market, alienate others in the decision making and implementation** and hence, see the political economy as their “self-serving shops and supermarkets” (Okolie, 2012b:36)

The above factors combine to make it difficult, if not impossible, for any development project, be it autochthonous or received, to succeed. However, after considering options and the way forward and borrowing from the prescriptions of Williamson’s Washington Consensus and Stiglitz’s post Washington Consensus, this lecture argues as follows:

♦ The adoption of liberal and neo-liberal development models in developing economies especially the Washington Consensus was ill- timed. In fact the only thing I considered wrong with the Washington Consensus as it concerns its adoption is that most peripheral capitalist economies have no productive economies where the Washington Consensus prescriptions could be applied. Hence the Consensus is relevant in economies that have attained a modicum of

complementarities and institutionalized productive sectors. It is definitely not applicable to peripheral capitalist economies with fledgling and largely comatose economic structure.

♦ The existence of political corruption is merely a symptom and not the cause of underdevelopment; indeed political corruption signifies that the political leadership lacks the initiative, competence and drive to guarantee effective, efficient and judicious utilization of public wealth for productive purposes. The existence of institutionalized mechanisms for appropriation and misappropriation of public wealth are symptoms that there exist political leaders with jaundiced and disparaged intellectual *tabula rasa*, and people of low mentality with high and rapacious appetitive residues who masquerade as “village headmasters” and hence, perceive leadership as **regimented monarchical acquisition**. Thus their obscured and mangled thinking faculties made them to unconsciously fan the ember of corruption as a means of soothing the nerves of their equally ignorant accomplices and hangers-on.

♦ The adoption of Joseph Stiglitz’s ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ by political leadership in developing economies will at best have a little impact in enhancing sustainable development. Post-Washington Consensus rightly emphasized the central and critical role of the state in advancing development. However, this will only occur in economies where the state is differentiated and dissociated from the socio-economic competitions; where the state is not part of the class struggle; where there is a clear distinctiveness between the state and the government; and where institutions of the state are entrenched and thus not appropriated and used for self-regarding interest. In some developing economies where the state is anything but neutral and autonomous, state intervention will rather be tantamount to brazen intervention, dictatorship and exclusion of majority by few economic notables/powerful people who personify the state and use their privileged positions to vitiate the very foundation of existing institutions.

♦ As demonstrated by the Chilean success story, the rule of law is critical to the advancement of any given society. However, this occurs where there is a strong legal framework that is independent of the other organs of governance. In most developing states, talking about the rule of law in economic management is akin to “condemning the political leadership to perpetual incarceration”. They represent and ride the law like a horse. Thus in a seeming situation of lawlessness arising from super structural decay, the substructure is sure to thrive on confusion (Okolie, 2012b:43).

We must emphasize that repeated development failures in peripheral capitalist economies are essentially self-inflicted virus. Indeed, most political leadership in developing economies function as automated receptive machines that garbage-in all development pills that originate from advanced capitalist economies, and subsequently garbage-out regimented alien development strategies that contradict with internal development conditions. Indeed, the Washington Consensus is one of such development pills advanced to all economies in Latin America. According to Rodrik (2006:3-4), the development strategy failed to stimulate sustainable development in Latin America. He also noted that the Latin American recovery in the

first half of the 1990s was very short-lived; and that there was less growth in per capita GDP in Latin America than in the period, 1950 – 1980. Indeed, Argentina, “the poster boy of the Latin American economic revolution” came crushing down in 2002.

While reviewing the amazing successes of India and China, the lecture notes that despite that they took unorthodox approaches to development (in the case of India, their lack of free trade policies at the time of their growth) they achieved development. Meanwhile, Stiglitz highlighted the importance of the meaning of success. He questioned the way the Washington Consensus and other accords have judged a country successful, noting that monitoring the GDP of a country does not reveal whether or not economic development has benefited the country as a whole. He therefore cited the example of the United States, where the GDP was increasing, but where jobs are stagnant and the average income has dropped by over 1,000 USD (Spang, 2006).

Perhaps, the financial catastrophe that befalls some Latin American economies after romancing with the Washington Consensus and the warning signal illuminated in the Post-Washington consensus gave rise to the success story, as articulated in “The Chile Consensus”. Munne (2004:2) noted that “the failure of neo-liberal reforms in Latin America during the 1990’s is due to their advocates’ inability to recognize the inexorable identity between a market economy and rule of law”. Thus, his central thesis is that:

advocates who implemented and backed governmental programs like Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989-1999), Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990-1992), Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990-2000), Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela (1989-1993) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico (1988-1994), among others, did not and could not contemplate the Chilean democratic experience that started in 1990 due to their misunderstanding of the analytical identity between market economy and Rule of Law.

After making some empirical comparisons between the economic performance of Chile and Argentina, especially between 1990 and 2002, Munne (2012:1-8) observed that:

the Chilean experience as of 1990 shows that what is needed for a market economy to be sustainable and grow stronger in the medium and long-term is a Rule of Law that guarantees certain predictable rules that, in turn, must be backed up by a basic **consensus among relevant political players**.

Indeed, the above illustrations apply to most states in Africa. In fact, the history of most African states is basically an exploration into the contour and changing dimensions of poverty and failures of development strategies. Most of these states were “**baptized**”, subsequently “**confirmed**” and admitted into the contaminated sea of excruciating, suffocating and seemingly unabated process/culture of exploitation, peripheralization, circuitous and cataclysmic development therapy. These, undoubtedly, leave a circular tale of underdevelopment, marginalization, marginality and most endemic/anemic poverty as well as associated malnourishment, penury and psychological imbecility.

As a corollary to the above, most Africa states are constrained by surging global inequality to reduce their primary efforts towards escaping from the shackles of partly self-inflicted and externally-foisted institutionalized underdevelopment. However, not much has been achieved as both macro- and micro-economic indicators constantly paint a very bleak picture. Available indices validly show that “Africa is not only the poorest region in the world but is also the only major developing region with negative growth in income per capita during 1980 – 2000” (Sachs, et al 2004: 117). While corroborating the above, Wolpe (2005:2) remarked as follows:

While Africa is home to only 10% of the world population; roughly 30% of the world’s poor are Africans. Since the mid-1980s the number of the poor in Africa has doubled to some

300 million and is expected to climb as high as 400 million by 2015. Thus Africa is the only region of the world where poverty is increasing in stark contrast to the dramatic gains in the fight against poverty that are seen elsewhere most notably in Asia.

The sordid scenario which appears intractable is caused largely by the adoption of defective and alien pills in development engineering. Thus while recounting the recurring development failures in Latin America, Munne (2004:1) stated as follows:

The failure of “neo – liberal” reforms in Latin America during the 1990s is due to their advocates’ inability to recognize the inexorable identity between a market economy and rule of law. This inability could be seen in the ten macroeconomic goals that were outlined in 1989 in “the Washington Consensus”. The process ... started in Chile in 1990 proves the identity between market – economy and rule of law. This document aims to explain why one consensus failed and the other succeeded.

While corroborating the observations of Munne, Stiglitz, (2003: 33-40) remarked that:

As of 2008, several Latin American countries are led by Socialist or other left-wing governments, some of which have campaigned and adopted policies contrary to the Washington Consensus set of policies. They have been joined in their criticism by some US economists ... who have challenged the ‘fundamentalist’ policies of the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury for what Stiglitz call a “one size fits all” treatment of individual economies. According to Stiglitz the treatment suggested by the IMF is too simple: one dose and fast – stabilize, liberalize and privatize, without prioritizing or watching for side effects –.

To amplify the point made above, I also identified several factors including leadership failures, personality cult and self-inflicted development crises in peripheral capitalist socio-formations as the bane of social transmutation. Okolie (2012) attempted an inductive demonstration of this using the regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. The intellectual piece centred on the link between personality syndrome and political leadership in developing states.

Meanwhile, personality is generally described by the use of the term trait. The concept ‘trait’ is widely used by psychologists to mean “a generalized and focalized neuropsychic system (peculiar to the individual), with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) terms of adaptive and expressive behaviour” (Allport, 1937:295). By personality trait, we refer to distinguishing and enduring characteristics, elements or quality of the human personality. Indeed, personality traits are products of and in fact reinforced by innate instinctual drives and mental apparatus. The quantum and intensities of the two elements in man impel him to activity and shape his democratic and/or autocratic predispositions.

Nevertheless, if these traits impel man towards saturated *cupiditas* and *libido dominandi*, he might turn himself into a power seeker who is immersed in what Charles Merriam called ‘facility-in-group-combination’. Thus such a man will become consumed in the selection of procedures by which favourable power balances are attained. In his analysis of political personality, Lasswell (1966:39-59) identified the following as basic qualities of the power-hungry man:

1. He demands power and seeks other values only as a basis for power.
2. He is insatiable in his demand for power.
3. He demands power for himself only, concerned as an ego separate from other.
4. His expectations are focused upon the past history and future possibilities affecting power.
5. He is sufficiently capable to acquire and supply the skills appropriate to his demands.

Extending the arguments above, this lecture notes that the power seekers weave a cult around themselves and use the lieutenants as instruments for clinging tenaciously to power. By the term **cult of personality** we refer to a political institution in which a country’s leader uses the

mass media to create a larger-than-life public image of self through unquestioning flattery and praise. The term also refers to leaders who did not use such methods during their life time, but are built up in them as media by later governments. A cult of personality differs from general hero worship in that it is specifically built around political leaders.

Throughout history, there have always been leaders who have fostered adulation. For much of pre-modern times, absolute monarchies were the dominant form of government, and monarchs were almost always held in enormous reverence. Through the principle of the divine right of kings, rulers were said to hold office by the will of God. However, the advent of democratic states in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries made it increasingly difficult for monarchs to preserve this status. Nonetheless, the revolution recorded in information technology enabled political leaders to project a positive image like never before.

Particularly in developing states where poverty level and illiteracy rate are critically high, most political leaders commit grave acts of looting of public treasury and use the resources to hold the population captive and arrogate the status of **tin-gods** unto themselves. The situation is further facilitated by the low level of material development of states in these societies. This is indeed the case in Nigeria where the then President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, turned himself into the 'state personified' and his party, Peoples Democratic Party, became 'Nigeria personified'. His wild ambition of transmuting into life President was scuttled but his anger was unleashed on such 'negative forces who dared to challenge their 'god'. As a self-acclaimed, all-knowing 'messiah', Chief Obasanjo tolerated no criticisms and dispensed political, social and economic favours in absolute consideration of obedience, loyalty and zombism to his utterances which he considered as ultimate law. The implications of this scenario on participatory democratic culture were better imagined.

Thematic Analysis of Obasanjo's Administration

We shall begin our analysis with specific cumulative assumptions:

1. The persistence of low level of development of the productive forces, disparate social relations of production and dis-oriented labour process have virtually vitiated the autonomy and capacity of the Nigerian state to perform its primary responsibilities.
2. The emergence of post-colonial political leaderships with impaired and disfigured mental apparatus and psychic-motor rather reinforces the persistence of hapless and weak state apparatus and institutions.
3. A combination of factors which include the emergence of major transnational economic and financial actors, establishment of regional groupings in parts of the world and expansion of the networks of ethno-regional militia further facilitate the erosion of sovereign state; and in the case of Nigeria, made it further possible for a few dominant groups to appropriate state apparatus for personal-regarding gains.
4. The personalization of apparatus of the state has further turned the privatization of public enterprise into privatization of sovereignty of the Nigeria State.
5. The privatization of sovereignty of the Nigerian State has remarkably eroded state capacity and legitimacy, and worse still extended to privatization of productive sectors of the economy.
6. The personalization and privatization of the productive sector of the economy have been translated into appropriation of the superstructure.
7. The resultant effects of the above are the formation and institutionalization of personality cult in political leadership.
8. The leaders who constitute themselves into personality cult generally possess high residues of instability and melancholic temperament; hence they are vicious, manifest

traces of psychic disorders and are primed towards committing suicidal actions against the masses.

9. Such men as noted in No. 8 above are authoritarian, and hence apply all means available to sustain their power base.

The above are empirically instructive. In fact, Obasanjo's administration was to say the least, dictatorial. Indeed, only an authoritarian leader exhibits the following patterns of behaviour:

- (a) He praises authority but represses criticisms.
- (b) His hostility is directed on those who are weak, authoritarian and inferior.
- (c) Has negative views of man and his works; the world is dangerous: offenders should be punished.
- (d) Personal feelings of weakness are covered by a façade of toughness.
- (e) Fear of self-examination, dependence on external guidance.
- (f) Superstitious: belief in mysterious agencies.
- (g) Use of rigid categories. No sub-alternatives; either a or b.
- (i) Intolerance of ambiguity.

President Olusegun Obasanjo and his cohorts fit neatly into the above postulates. We shall not belabour a living reality, an objective and recurring situation. We shall not belabour the roles played by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) to suppress and punish the opposition. It is not our intention to re-echo the fact that some governors and their agents were indicted for gross embezzlement, looting of state treasury and murder, and yet they were let off the hook and rather smuggled in as senators of the Federal Republic. More so, their agents were subsequently honoured and congratulated for their bravery and steadfastness in criminality with appointments into public offices. We shall not comment on the Dariye and Alamieyeseigha saga. We make bold to state that Obasanjo constituted a personality cult which equated itself with a

Leviathan and dispensed political and economic favours to those “zombies” who understand and practise what Obasanjo himself, a supposedly “democratic leader,” called **“military-type loyalty”**.

Recall that the Nigerian state is a colonial creation and the indigenous class is equally a colonial derivative. Their reasoning and instinctual drive are tainted and steeped in Western tradition. They are uncoordinated, primordial and confused. Their primary motivation is to sustain the parasitic tradition of the colonial state and to personalize the apparatus of the state for personal-regarding interests.

Therefore, the post-colonial state in Nigeria is economically and structurally weak. Particularly during the dispensation of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the administration had almost succeeded in privatizing both public enterprises and the sovereignty of the state as well. He decided which portion of the federation was “dashed out” to satisfy Western interests (refer to the recent handover of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon). He decided how much a liter of fuel should cost; and who got which oil bloc. He also determined which parastatal or public enterprise was sold and to whom. Worst still, he determined who was “returned” in which election. Regrettably, he was quoted as stating that he would not hand over to the Vice-President because the latter refused to learn the lesson in **“military-type loyalty”**.

In the 2003 general elections which were widely believed to be massively and shamefully rigged, Obasanjo turned the coercive apparatus of the state against the citizens and unleashed monumental and unprecedented acts of violence and criminality against the people (Onu & Momoh, 2005; Jega & Ibeanu, 2007). In sum, these studies show that the Nigerian State is hapless, prostrate, hijacked and privatized.

However, the present scenario has undermined participatory democratic culture. The experiences of the 1999 and 2003 general elections have imbued in Nigerians, especially the

youths a new “democratic thinking” rooted in personality adulation. Democracy in Nigeria today has come to mean “might is right”. Governance has come to emphasize only distribution and not production. Present and future political aspirants have come to see in PDP, the only source of survival and self-reproduction. The language has changed from “elected to return”. Nigeria has transcended conventional prebendalism to extreme “adulation and personality worship”; loyalty and accountability to the gladiators is now the only path to political offices. Allegiance to the masses is now anachronistic as citizens’ rights to exercise their franchise and choose their political leaders have now been vitiated, if not outright but tacitly banned.

Indeed, the privatization of state sovereignty and erosion of its legitimacy have undermined the relationship between the state and the citizens. The hegemonic and self-accounting undertakers have now arrogated unto themselves the responsibility of defining and enforcing such relationship. The above is made possible by the flagrant privatization of productive sectors and existing mode of production. The impoverished and hapless Nigerian state now derives its life-line and survival from these elements that constitute themselves into personality cult. The group has appropriated primary state responsibility and the next stage is the parceling out of the territory to political loyalist for “a monarchical-like dominion”. Participatory democratic culture has now been sacrificed on the altar of modern imperial dictatorship and supported by political robots and “automated zombies”. The masses have, more than ever, been alienated and excluded from decision making in the affairs of the state. The above remains the lot of most states in developing economies. Of course, the end result is generally intolerance, political alienation and exclusion of the majority by the few, appropriation and expropriation of the public wealth, et cetera and the consequent conflicts arising therefrom.

The above is a clear demonstration that the advanced capitalist economies create and institutionalize, in developing economies, a conservative, self-destructive, unproductive,

intellectually imbecile and unrepentantly rapacious and unabashed neo-colonial class whose primary occupation is idleness; and whose motivation is largely rooted in appropriation, misappropriation and shameless stealing of public wealth. This class creates personality cult in political leadership of their respective “self-serving political kingdoms/empires;” and hence, derive their political positions, not from the mandate of the governed, but from their subservience to the advanced capitalist interests.

State Explained

To properly situate our exposition into theoretical perspective and hence abstract from barefoot empiricism, I shall henceforth explore the meaning and trajectories of the state, and further establish a nexus between the state and the market. As aptly noted by Miliband (1969:49):

The State does not exist as such, but is a conceptual reference point that "stands for ... a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system". This state system is actually composed of five elements that are each identified with a cluster of particular institutions, including: the governmental apparatus, which consists of elected legislative and executive authorities at the national level, which make state policy; the administrative apparatus, consisting of the civil service bureaucracy, public corporations, central banks, and regulatory commissions, which regulate economic, social, cultural, and other activities; the coercive apparatus, consisting of the military, para-military, police, and intelligence agencies, which together are concerned with the deployment and management of violence; the judicial apparatus, which includes courts, the legal profession, jails and prisons, and other components of the criminal justice system; the sub-central governments, such as states, provinces, or departments, counties, municipal governments, and special districts

The above quotation vividly captures the basic features of the state. Meanwhile, literature on the meaning and nature of the state is richly over-subscribed and yet the concept is in search of empirical and concrete meaning.

Meanwhile, Okolie (2014:5) remarked that “the state is largely an unavoidable human contraption for managing interpersonal, group and societal relationships”. Lin (1939) defined the

historic state as a territorial human society which exercises, through a government, supreme coercive power over individuals and groups within it for the purpose of regulating and maintaining a general hierarchy of social values and institutions. Other scholars who predicated their definitions of state from the materialist standpoint include Lenin (1976), Ake (1985a, 1985b) and Ibeanu (1998). Ake (1985a:105, 1985b:9) for instance defined the state:

as a specific modality of class domination; a modality of domination in which class domination is autonomized. By autonomization is meant that the institutional mechanisms of class domination are constituted in a way that they enjoy independence from....society such that they appear, following Engels (1987), as an objective force standing alongside society.

Meanwhile, the state had always existed across socio-formations. However, the character remains insipient and fossilizing. Hence, those “invincible hands” that brought social relations within the bounds of order and has monopoly control and use of instruments of coercion constitute what is known as the state. Thus the character of the state had always reflected the prevailing level of development of the production forces, social relations of production, refining potentials of the labour process, interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces within the polity as well as the existing level of social atomization/cohesion.

Presently, studies on the state particularly in Africa and developing economies comprise individual researches of the state based on certain themes and case studies, and studies on the comprehensive theory of the state (Kawabata, 2006). He further introduced trends in the comprehensive theory of the state as follows:

- a) The first period is from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s. As stated by Young (1982), theory of the African state could be classified into three pathways that is Afro-Marxism, People’s Socialism and African capitalism.
- b) The second period in the evolution in the theory of African state appeared from the end of the 1990s’ through to the beginning of the 2000s. Emphasis shifted to the role of African state.

As crisply noted by Villalon (1998), the vulnerability of African states shows itself in five different faces including: the client state, the personalized state, the centralized state, the prebendal state and the extractive. The periods hence marked a reassessment of African state as engine for social development.

No doubt, the enquiry was smacked by the continuous failure of the state to stimulate development and resolve the contradictions inherent in the development strategies employed by successive leaders in Africa to enhance sustainable and autochthonous development. Indeed, after due consideration of the above, I observed as follows:

1. that scholars are consumed in absorbing functional roles of the state and unwittingly gloss over the actual meaning and perspective of states in Africa;
2. that scholars who attempted insightful analysis of the term ended up amplifying the interests which the state serves; and
3. that a few other contributions in this regard were generalized blemish, emotive and mundane; and hence thrived on largely circular intellectual analysis with little hope of breaking the circle (Okolie, 2010c:9).

To avoid the above pitfalls and hence situate the state in its historical context and non-transient materialist foundation, I re-conceptualize the state *as that living public power and custodian of the totality of instruments, structures, human and non-human elements as well as territorially designated cosmic order and ecological endowment of the given polity unit. This public power regulates human conducts through governmental apparatus; promotes and enforces shared societal values, norms and customary practices and more importantly enunciates and superintends over behavioural currents and transactions within the defined enclave*. Indeed, the character and intensity of these regulatory functions are largely influenced by the level of development of the productive forces. This public power effectively has monopoly over the use of available coercive instruments and uses same to regenerate itself and bring societal interaction within the bounds of prescribed and tolerable order (Okolie, 2014:7).

Critical Theories of the State

Basically, social science literature is inundated with strands of thought on the conceptualization of the state. The seeming epistemological differences among these views largely emanate from clear-cut paradigmatic orientations of scholars as well as the functional and historical roles of the state in a given socio-formation. However, the series of intellectual debates can be broadly delineated under the **liberal** and **Marxist** theories, as analysed below.

The Liberal Theory

Proponents of the theory argue that the state emerged to protect private property. According to them, the state is an impartial umpire that emerged to keep social dissent within a manageable order. Thus they profess and advocate organic evolution of the state and indeed adumbrate that the institutions of the state exist for collective interests.

Again, they, *inter alia*, argue that the liberal conception of the state is of a limited organization that represents popular will. The state plays a minimal role in the directing of society and economic affairs, but can play a significant supporting role in modern liberal (social liberal) theories. *Classical liberals* favour a minimal state that only provides for basic services such as defence, enforcing contracts and protecting property rights. *Social liberals* accept more roles for the state, primarily in the economic sphere, such as regulation of capitalism, in order to protect consumers and workers, welfare programmes to help the poor and disadvantaged in society and public services that benefit everyone. To the liberals, the state plays a supporting role in society, and is usually left to operate in the political and social spheres.

The views stated above were vigorously canvassed by the pluralists. Pluralism refers to a liberal or open society where different classes of groups compete for power, domination, and influence. Pluralism is the theory that a multitude of groups, not the people as a whole, govern the state. These organizations, which include trade unions and professional associations,

environmentalists, civil rights activists, business and financial lobbies, and formal and informal coalitions of like-minded citizens, influence the making and administration of laws and policy. Since the participants in this process constitute only a tiny fraction of the populace, the public acts mainly as bystanders.

Characteristics of Pluralism

- The society is dominated not by single elite but rather by a multiplicity of relatively small groups, some of which are well organized and funded, some of which are not, and the scope of their power is restricted to relatively narrow areas such as defence, agriculture, or banking.
- The groups are politically autonomous, or independent.
- Intergroup competition leads to countervailing influence: The power of one group tends to cancel that of another so that a rough equilibrium results. Group memberships overlap as well. Members of one association, in other words, might belong to another, even competing, group.
- It is open in two senses. First, most organizations are seldom if ever completely shut off from the outside. They continuously recruit new members from all walks of life. Second, the availability of unused resources constantly encourages the formation of new groups.

Arising from the foregoing, this lecture delineates the fundamental principles of the liberal theory as follows:

1. The state is not superior to other institutions. The state is simply one social institution amongst many. Each has its proper sphere. The state has its proper sphere. It should not appropriate the spheres of other institutions.
2. The state ought to respect the fault principle. The state ought not to reward those who are blameworthy for their blameworthiness. The state ought not otherwise promote blameworthy conduct or attach disincentives to virtuous conduct in any way.
3. The state is the supremacy of law and adherence to established, proper procedures.
4. The power of the state ought to be fragmented and distributed amongst many centers. This principle is founded on the observation expressed in Lord Acton's aphorism that "*Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely*".

Therefore the liberal theorists reflect the three of the major tenets of the pluralist school, as stated below:

- (1) resources and hence potential power are widely scattered throughout society;
- (2) at least some resources are available to nearly everyone; and
- (3) at any time the amount of potential power exceeds the amount of actual power.

Marxist Theory of the State

Marxism contains two rather interfacing views of the state. It views the state as the instrument of domination by exploiting classes that are defined by their position within the process of social production. Therefore, it defines the state as the executive committee of the ruling class. Marx subsequently conceived the state as a parasitic body. Basically, the Marxists conceive the state from these seemingly exclusive but interrelated senses.

■ **The State as an Instrument of the Ruling Class.** Basically, the instrumentalists noted that the state is an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class itself. They argue that the functioning of the state is understood in terms of the instrumental exercise of power by people in strategic positions, either directly through the manipulation of state policies or indirectly through the exercise of pressure on the state.

■ **The State as an Ideal Collective Capitalist.** The proponents argue that capital is neither self-reproducing nor capable on its own of securing the conditions of its own reproduction. They noted that the very continuity of the capitalist social formation is dependent upon certain interventions being made which, though in the general interest of capital collectively, are not in the individual interest of any particular capital (Hirsch, 1978:66).

■ **The State as a Factor of Cohesion within the Social Formation.** The proponents include Nicos Poulantzas, Bukharin, Jessop, Gramsci etc. They are generally ascribed to the **structuralist** analysis of the state. They argue that the state is understood in terms of its effects and is defined in terms of its role in maintaining the unity and cohesion of a social formation by concentrating and sanctioning class domination.

Indeed, the **Instrumentalist** and the **Structuralist** analyses of the state dominate the Marxian thesis on the state. Miliband's writings are most notable for re-establishing an instrumentalist theory of the state. Prior to Miliband, the instrumentalist theory of the state had been articulated cryptically by Sweezy (1972:243), who asserted that "the state is an instrument

in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself". Miliband (1969:23) identified the ruling class of a capitalist society as “that class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society”.

Both authors trace this concept of the state to Marx's famous dictum in *The Communist Manifesto* that the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. One of the most direct indicators of ruling-class domination of the state is the degree to which members of the capitalist class control the state apparatus through interlocking positions in the governmental, administrative, coercive, and other apparatuses. Miliband (1969:54) emphasized that "It is these institutions in which 'state power' lies, and it is through them that this power is wielded in its different manifestations by the people who occupy the leading positions in each of these institutions".

Nicos Poulantzas became the leading spokesperson for a **structuralist theory** of the state. He claims that the basic structure of the capitalist mode of production generates contradictory class practices and crisis tendencies that inexorably disrupt the capitalist system at the economic, political, and ideological levels. These crises tendencies and contradictions necessitate a separate structure to specifically maintain and restore its equilibrium as a system. Although Poulantzas modified systems analysis by introducing class conflict as a disequilibrating mechanism, he was nevertheless clearly indebted to the American functionalists and systems theorists in arguing that the general function of the state in the capitalist mode of production is its function as "the regulating factor of its global equilibrium as a system" (Poulantzas, 1969:45).

Whereas Miliband articulates an institutionalist conception of power, Poulantzas articulates a functionalist conception of power anchored on the methodological assumptions of structural functionalism. Poulantzas draws a sharp analytic distinction between the concepts of state power and the state apparatus. Poulantzas defines the state apparatus as: "(a) the place of the state in the ensemble of the structures of a social formation, that is, the state's functions; and (b) the personnel of the state, the ranks of the administration, bureaucracy, army, etc" (Poulantzas, 1969: 116). The state apparatus is a unity of the effects of state power (i.e. policies) and the network of institutions and personnel through which the state function is executed. Poulantzas emphasizes the functional unity between state power and the state apparatus with the observation "that structure is not the simple principle of organization which is exterior to the institution: the structure is present in an allusive and inverted form in the institution itself" (Poulantzas, 1969:115).

Poulantzas defines state power as the capacity of a social class to realize its objective interests through the state apparatus. Bob Jessop observes that within this framework "state power is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains, or restores the conditions required for capital accumulation in a given situation and it is non-capitalist to the extent these conditions are not realised" (Poulantzas: 1969:221). In structuralist theory, the objective effects of state policies on capital accumulation and the class structure are the main objective indicators of state power.

Despite the seeming divergence in the conceptualization and application of the state, the Marxists still appreciate the following as the underlying principles of the school:

- ◆there is a capitalist class defined by its ownership and control of the means of production;
- ◆the capitalist class uses the state to dominate the rest of society; and
- ◆state policies further the general interests of the capitalist class in maintaining their domination of society.

State vs. Market Contestations

The state vs. market contestations dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries. In consideration of the historical trajectories of the state and market matrix, Linn (2006:1-3) remarked that “swings in dominance between state and market go back many centuries”. He maintains that the industrialization process of the West in the 19th century was characterized by a dominant market and a small government sector. However, after World War I the state took over, not only in the Soviet Union but also within the enclaves of her allies. Western governments also assumed growing roles after the Great Depression and then during and after World War II, with the rise of socialist ideology, the economic theory of "market failure" and the belief in planning by government as a way to promote a stronger economy and a better life for its citizens. Meanwhile, Schuman (2011:1) noted that:

For much of the past 30 years, the long-running, 20th century contest between state and market had appeared settled. The strong, post-Reagan economic performance of the U.S. based on deregulation, free trade and capital flows and globalization appeared to confirm the virtues of liberal economic policies, while the collapse of the Soviet Union and the capitalist revolution in China proclaimed the death of state-dominated systems. Free capitalism had emerged a clear winner

The remarks by Schuman above appear cogent and axiomatic. Throughout recorded history, the global political economy has traversed from one form of state vs. market contestations to another. Fundamentally, market economy doctrine is driven by the conviction that government that governs the least governs the best. Hence, it makes case for limited intervention of the state in the management of the economy. As aptly noted by Nadgrodkiewicz (2012:1):

Market economy means creating and supporting institutions such as property rights, contract enforcement, freedom of enterprise, etc. States must also be able to provide basic

infrastructure to facilitate economic activity in order for these institutions to meaningfully function. In most Western countries, the impulse fueled by the global financial crisis has generally been to reduce the size of the state. Yet for many developing countries the real question is not whether to reduce the size of the state but how to make the state perform better, whatever its optimal scope may be.

Linn (2006) noted that by the late 1970s the socialist, central planning and statist models ran out of steam around the globe, as a backlash of neo-liberalism, based on the ideas of Milton Friedman and translated into the policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, took hold in many parts of the world, including in Russia after 1990. Therefore, “government failure,” excessive size of government and too much state interventions were blamed for many of the world's ills. Hence market economy was seen as panacea to the problem.

Meanwhile, towards the last decade of the 20th century, Williamson came up with what he called Washington Consensus. As indicated in Okolie (2009) Washington Consensus is a disguised rebirth and reinvigoration of neo-liberal development framework. The basic precepts of the Consensus are:

- fiscal policy discipline;
- redirection of public spending from subsidies (“especially indiscriminate subsidies”) toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment;
- tax reform – broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates;
- interest rates that are market determined and positive (but moderate) in real terms;
- competitive exchange rates;
- trade liberalization – liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing etc); any trade protection to be provided by relatively uniform tariffs;
- liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;
- privatization of State enterprises;
- deregulation – abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environment and consumer protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions; and
- legal security of property rights.

It is important to emphasize that the Washington consensus was to a large degree a reaction to the macroeconomic crisis that afflicted much of the Latin American countries, and some other developing regions, during the 1980s. The crisis was caused by the following:

- the drastic rise in the price of imported oil following the emergence of OPEC;
- mounting levels of external debts; and
- the exogenous rise in US (and hence international) interest rates, and consequent upon the foregoing problems, the loss of access to additional foreign credit.

Thus Williamson was convinced that the Washington consensus would provide better development alternative to Latin American countries. Williamson equally appreciates that the term has taken on a different meaning more closely related to market fundamentalism than his original prescription entails. He maintained that “while his prescriptions were focused on reducing the role of government, he does not endorse market fundamentalism, and hence believes that his prescriptions, if implemented correctly, would benefit the poor” (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998:237).

He remarked that the policy, as embodied in the Washington Consensus, had focused too narrowly on pursuing economic growth through the deregulation of the markets – and the consequent need for a new paradigm for development (Stiglitz, 1998b).

Fundamentally, Stiglitz advocated a shift to what he termed a Post – Washington Consensus, basing his intervention on two points viz:

- (1) He suggests that while the Washington Consensus correctly emphasized the need for macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization and getting prices right, its policies were sometimes misguided in these areas. He remarked that the policies failed to recognize the need for complementary measures to ensure sound financial regulation and an effective role for the state in areas such as human capital formation and technology transfer; all of which are essential for making market work.
- (2) He suggests that the Washington Consensus confused means (privatization and trade liberalization and a nominal increase in GDP) with ends (a more sustainable, equitable and democratic growth which brings about a general increase in well being) (Parkins, 1999: 2).

Stiglitz therefore dismissed the simplistic analysis of the Washington Consensus and remarked that development involves trade-offs, and therefore real political choices that cannot be resolved by the technocratic intervention. Thus, he argued for a new consensual participatory form of development strategy, defined through dialogue among donors, the state and civil society that will serve as a catalyst for society-wide social changes (Parkins 1999). Also, Stiglitz argued that such a strategy must simultaneously develop the private sector, the state, the community, the family and the individual in a coherent, interrelated way, by setting priorities and providing the necessary resources, economic management, knowledge, sectoral planning, and social and organizational capital (Parkin, 1999).

Therefore, while appreciating the important role of government and social sectors in sustainable economic growth and development, Stiglitz (2006:2) outlined some of the key requirements for the Post – Washington Consensus, as follows:

- (1) strong anti-trust and anti- monopoly laws;
- (2) strong government, transport with an effective and accessible judicial system; and
- (3) the active promotion of the idea that people are the key to economic success but are the product of that success via the following:
 - strong social safety nets (such as those in Nordic countries) that support individuals and allow for entrepreneurial risk taking;
 - investment in both primary and higher level education and research and development; and
 - access to credit at all levels and to all sectors of society, and redistribution of funds to combat inequality.

Arising from the foregoing analysis is the fact that the Post-Washington Consensus is largely a combination of development artifacts: a third-way type challenge to neo-liberalism on the basis of innovative mainstream economic analysis, combined with an attempt to incorporate the fundamental ideas of modernization paradigm into the heart of development policy making on the basis of 1990s participatory rhetoric. Thus, as noted by Parkin (1999:3), “the Post-

Washington Consensus is an attempt to receive the largely dormant idea that development is about providing a real transformation through (state) interventionist policies”.

According to Linn (2006:2), “in market economies the market prevails in both the productive and the social spheres”. The strength of this system lies in its flexibility, competitiveness and generally high rates of growth. But it suffers from high inequality, serious pockets of poverty, neglect of environmental problems and possible financial crises. Most market economies face pressures towards greater engagement by the state, especially in the social and environmental spheres. It is in fact necessary to point out that the **marketisation principle** is fundamentally aligned with the notion of **ideologisation of development**.

According to Easterly (2007:1), ideologization of development “is not only about having experts design your free market for you, it is about having the experts see poverty as a purely technological problem, to be solved by engineering and the natural sciences, ignoring the messy social sciences such as economics, politics, and sociology”. Sachs for example argues that African problems are solvable with practical and proven technologies. He thus advocated for hundreds of expert interventions, through the Specialized United Nations’ agencies, to solve every problem of the poor - from green manure, breast-feeding education and bicycles to solar energy systems, school uniforms to aid orphans and windmills. However, by ideologizing development, the proponents present yet another uniform and “universally-valid” strategy to development. Of course this cannot be given differential material and non-material endowments of socio-formations. Indeed, development *per se* is not, and cannot be an ideology. In fact, the pattern and intensity of development strategy adopted by most of the developing states at a given historical epoch is largely designed to consolidate the dominant global mode of production.

Meanwhile, the whole idea of experimenting with ideology of development in Africa followed the growing need to address the perennial problems associated with underdevelopment. In fact, the deepening incidence of **want**, and the quest to stimulate sustainable development prompted successive leaderships to wallow from one development fad to another. Over the years, successive political leaderships in Africa have been engrossed with the onerous task of enhancing sustainable development. Several strands of development strategies have also been adopted and implemented. These include Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa (1975-77); The Monrovia Strategy (1979); Lagos Plan of Action (1980); Structural Adjustment Programme (1985-88); African Alternative Framework to the Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989); African Charter for Popular Participation (1990); Conference on Security, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA); Global Coalition to Attract Financial and Economic Assistance to Africa; The Everything For All By The Year 2000 Initiative; The 2020 Initiative; Copenhagen Social Summit Framework; The Highly Indebted Poor Countries Framework; The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; African Economic Community/African Union; The Lome Agreement and presently the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) launched in 2001(Okolie, 2005).

However, these strategies failed to transmute the region out of the woods as incidence of poverty persists and in fact, continues to deepen to seemingly intractable dimension. Indeed, elements of “ideology of development” were contained in the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) foisted on Africa in the mid-1980s. Following the collapse of the socialist bloc, virtually all development pills administered to African states have the trappings of expert-designed development model. Thus the role of experts, technocrats and economic development soothsayers became pronounced. However, several years of romanticizing with this model

appear to have aggravated the incidence of poverty because of a number of reasons, including the following:

- (1) the ideologization of development in Africa, impel successive African leaderships to confuse development with dominant global mode of production; and unwittingly pursue consolidation of received mode of production in place of development of their respective economies.
- (2) Most development strategies adopted by successive administrations in Africa are tainted in ideological confusion. Each subsisting mode of production recommend and foist ideologically-laden development strategy which, at best, helps to consolidate a lop-sided mode of production, and slant the entrenchment of competitive social relations of production.
- (3) The ideologically-tainted development strategies discountenance the specificity of local development conditions as well as ecological factors that would have supported the existing local development potentials. Thus development strategies hang in symphony outside the material foundation of the recipient economy.
- (4) As empirically demonstrated in a previous study I conducted on the United Nations Development Programme, in 2001, the so-called technocrats, experts generally have shallow idea about development potentials/endowments of constituent communities and expectedly end up administering “wrong pills” to the “dying patients”.
- (5) Most of these technocrats are arm-chair theorists who are versed in top-bottom approach to economic development.
- (6) In addition, most of the experts and technocrats are so harassed by poverty that they degenerate to “political praise-singers” who tell the leaders only what they wish to hear.
- (7) More fundamental is that the prescriptions of the ideology of development cannot really work in Africa. Solutions to African development crises lie in evolving community-based holdings. These must be based on bottom-top agenda aimed at re-instituting agro-allied (small and medium scales, arts and crafts) ventures, supported by finances from the political institution.
- (8) As a corollary of the above, Africa must be allowed to pursue independent and autochthonous economic development strategies that focus on satisfying the domestic needs of the populace before considering the expectations/demands of the global political economy (Okolie, 2010c:11-12).

The conclusion above was however captured concretely in the study we conducted in 2009. Indeed, Okolie & Ohiaegbu (2009) attempted a critical survey of the literature on the international development policy establishment (IDPE) orthodoxy. It focuses on three main questions: (i) is there a convergence between the policies the developing countries were advised

to pursue for their development and that which the currently developed countries had pursued at contemporaneous stages of development? (ii) was “developmental state” and strong government interventions responsible for the high performance in the currently advanced economies and the East Asian economies or was it the efficiency-enhancing power of free markets? and (iii) has the unpacking of FDI and a shift from the *dirigiste* (state-dominated) development approach to a market-dominated model led to an “automatic progress” in the developing countries’ industrialization?.

In respect of these questions, three observations were made. First, while the literature on political ideology of national development proffer the formula of the "magic of the market for national development which emphasized a shift from a state-dominated to a market-dominated international economy, on the contrary, a comparison of development approach between currently developed countries, and the Newly Developed Countries (NDCs) and the developing countries suggest there is no convergence between policies, institutions and economic growth as emphasized. Second, existing explanations for “what makes development happen”, do not adequately account for the role of the state in the market and in the industrialization process of the society. Third, recommendations for overcoming the economic backwardness of the developing nations have a very serious short-term and long-term implications for the resource-dependent states and have not generally led to their transition “*from third world to first world economy as promised by the market fundamentalist propagandists* for policy reforms. Therefore, this seeming failure of the market doctrine triggered off counter-reactions. Subsequently, several scholars began to make cases for state-centric posture.

Indeed, under state-centric planning, the state predominates in both the productive and the social spheres. Thus, state capitalism combines a passive role of government in the social and

environmental spheres with a relatively heavy engagement of the government in the productive sphere, especially the "commanding heights" of the economy—the natural resource sectors (especially energy), large-scale and technology intensive industries (including aerospace), military supply industries and banking (Linn, 2006:2). In fact, for robust debate on the propriety of state or market dominance in economic planning and development, see Garnaut (1990), Singh (1993), Moreno and Ros (1993), O'Donnelli (1993), Shapiro (1993), Dutt (1993), Felix (1993), Williamson (1990), Stiglitz (2006) et cetera. The implications of these for sustainable development and eradication of underdevelopment shall be examined subsequently.

However, the root of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment can be traced to the internationalization of trade, associated trade regimes and foisted global practices. Nevertheless, the elasticity of development and underdevelopment is a product of the prevailing global capitalist ethos.

International Trade Practices and Underdevelopment

The international political economy is essentially driven by regimented capitalism. In the "cold war" order, which was largely an order characterized by seemingly fierce ideological war between the United States-led advanced capitalist economies and the Soviet-propelled socialist/communist bloc, the World was basically polarized along two contending ideological blocs. However, strictly speaking, we can unequivocally submit that the "war" was not essentially between two contending modes of production. This is because, socialism never altered the post-Westphalia state structure and indeed it operated more as corrective strata of capitalism which merely emphasized more equitable distribution pattern and collectivization of production ideals (Okolie, 2010b: 129).

Nevertheless, the disintegration of the **revisionist bloc** by the defunct Soviet Union in 1990/91 signalled the seemingly triumph of core capitalism and hence resulted in the whittling down of reformist values as expounded and propagated by the Soviet- led group. Consequently,

it led to institutionalization of conservative capitalist values and leaves the US as the undisputable leader of capitalist–propelled global order.

Thus, the present structure of the global political economy moves under the fulcrum of capitalist values—liberalization agenda, privatization, deregulation of the economy, shrinking role of the state in economic activities, primacy of market forces, private investors-driven economy, free and unfettered movement of international investment capital, competition etc. These values, ideals and preference were further reinforced and entrenched by the surging globalization checklists. Indeed, in the present circumstance, constituent states were compelled to adjust their actions, reactions and foreign policy stance and postures to reflect the prevailing order.

Meanwhile, capitalism as a dominant mode of production has undergone transformations over the years. From the incidence leading to the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia to the present dispensation, capitalism has remained **largely** the only dominant mode of production. Following the organic composition of capital arising from contradictions between the social relations of production and productive forces in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, the need to extend capitalist mode beyond the frontiers of Europe arose. Thus with the incursion and capture of peripheral economies by the machinations of capitalism, the political and economic circumstances of these states were changed, distorted, disarticulated and re-structured.

As a corollary to the above, the expansive and corrosive nature of capitalism as catalyst for advancing domination of countries by others through the machinations of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism have been aptly captured (Lenin, 1991). Indeed, Ake (1981:26-29) “exposed the synergy existing between capitalist expansion (industrial revolution) and international trade”. In fact, the latter is basically a product of the former and subsequently

lubricated and automated the process of instituting and advancing underdevelopment in peripheral capitalist socio-formations.

By international trade we refer to:

The exchange of goods and services between countries. This type of trade gives rise to a world economy, in which prices, or supply and demand, affect and are affected by global events. Political change in Asia, for example, could result in an increase in the cost of labour, thereby increasing the manufacturing costs for an American sneaker company based in Malaysia, which would then result in an increase in the price that you have to pay to buy the tennis shoes at your local mall. A decrease in the cost of labour, on the other hand, would result in you having to pay less for your new shoes. (Heakal, 2003:1).

He noted that the idea behind trading is to give consumers and countries operating in the global space the opportunity to be exposed and access goods and services not available in their respective domain. Global political economy provides the platform for actors to converge and trade their products and purchase items of interest.

According to liberal scholars, international trade opens up the opportunity for specialization and therefore more efficient use of resources, and also has the potential to maximize a country's capacity to produce and acquire goods. Opponents of global free trade have argued, however, that international trade still allows for inefficiencies that leave developing nations compromised. Perhaps, the fears and contradictions generated on the pros and cons of international trade led to the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948 to negotiate tariff concessions between signatories and provide a mechanism for dispute resolution. However, wide condemnation and protests by mostly developing economies against the failure of GATT to create a new order and stimulate development in Third World countries subsequently led to its replacement by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995.

Thus, the WTO deals with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. The bulk of the WTO's current work comes from the 1986–94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under GATT. The WTO is currently the host to new negotiations, under the 'Doha Development Agenda' launched in 2001.

Where countries have faced trade barriers and wanted them lowered, the negotiations have helped to open markets for trade. But the WTO is not just about opening markets, and in some circumstances its rules support maintaining trade barriers — for example, to protect consumers or prevent the spread of disease. The system's overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable side effects — because this is important for economic development and well-being. The critical functions include:

- Administering WTO trade agreements
- Forum for trade negotiations
- Handling trade disputes
- Monitoring national trade policies
- Technical assistance and training for developing countries
- Cooperation with other international organizations.

However, empirical evidence has demonstrated that the prevailing trade rules have rather exacerbated and complicated the prospects of stimulating sustainable development in peripheral capitalist socio-formations and in reducing development gap. Basically, fledgling economies have been on the receiving ends for the following reasons:

- Negotiations and interdependence suggest existence of strong or equivalent economic infrastructure which supports such negotiations and provides alternative course of action in the event of collapse. Developing economies with inchoate and mono-cultural economic structure have no bargaining power and hence have remained hewers of wood and drawers of water among the comity of nations.
- Particularly during negotiations on agriculture, developing economies have always been short-changed thereby resulting in the making of rules and agreements which are harmful

to their interests. For instance, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards Agreement contains some curious provisions which have some implications for (un)employment in developing states. First it was a disguised way of restricting the exportation of African products in the pretext that they are substandard or that they do not measure up to the standards approved by the SPS agreement (Okolie & Iloh, 2009:69).

- Again WTO rules on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) tactfully phased out local content principles thereby undermining autochthonous development and hence escalates incidence of unemployment in developing economies.
- Moreover, Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) has deliberately limited the scope for poor countries to develop the active industrial and technological policies needed to raise productivity and hence succeed in world markets. More worrisome is that the rules have not only outlawed many of the policies that helped East Asian countries to make rapid advances, but have also raised the cost of technology transfer.
- More criminal is the deliberate policy of discouraging developing states from processing their primary products before exporting them to the industrialized markets. In Japan for instance, tariffs on processed food products are 7 times higher than on first-stage products. In Canada, they are 12 times higher. In the EU, tariffs rise from 0% to 9% on cocoa paste and to 30% on the final product (UNDP, 2005:127). These escalating tariffs help to confine countries like Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire to the export of unprocessed cocoa beans, thereby locking them into a volatile, low value added raw cocoa market agreement (Okolie & Iloh, 2009:70).
- Through the framework of the OECD and in flagrant violation of the WTO rules, developed states subsidize their agricultural products thereby outcompeting products coming from developing states. According to the UNDP (2005) rich countries have always promised to cut these agricultural subsidies. This has never happened. The United States Department of Agriculture estimated that in 2005 alone, the 20,000 US cotton farmers received government payments of US\$4.7 billion (UNDP, 2005:131).
- With limited resources, developing countries have far few concessions to grant.
- Goods from developing economies are not in great demand, thus these countries do not bargain from positions of strength.

The scenario noted above explain why the share of developing states in global trade is critically low in relation to their counterparts from developed states. Tables 1-5 below present import volume growth across regions, 2001-2013, import of goods and services (Trillion USD),

global export of goods and services by region (Trillion USD), import growth by region in per cent and trade shocks of major country groups and major regions, 2004-2015 respectively:

Table 1: Import volume growth across regions, 2001-2013

Regions	2001-2007 (average per cent)	2012 (per cent)	2013 (per cent)
East Asia	>10, <12	> 4, <6	5
South Asia	13	>2, < 4	< 1
Western Asia	>10 < 12	4	4.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	7	5	>2, < 4
Africa	9	4	5

Source: UN/DESA. Data for 2013

Table 2: Import of goods and services (Trillion USD)

Regions	2008	2011	2013
Developed countries	11	13	12.5
East Asia	4.5	4.8	5.3
Latin America	>1, < 2	<2	<2
South Asia	<1	1	1
Sub Saharan Africa	0.2	<0.4	<0.5
Transition Economies	0.5	0.7	1
West Asia and North Africa	1	0.8	1.1

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014) *Key Statistics and Trend in International Trade*. Switzerland: UNCTAD

Table 3: Global Export of goods and services by Region (Trillion USD)

Regions	2008	2011	2013
Developed countries	12.5	13	13.5
East Asia	4.2	4.9	5.2
Latin America	>1	1	1
South Asia	<0.5	<1	<1
Sub Saharan Africa	0.1	0.3	<0.3
Transition Economies	0.5	0.6	0.8
West Asia and North Africa	>1, <2	>1, <2	>1, <2

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014) *Key Statistics and Trend in International Trade*. Switzerland: UNCTAD

Table 4: Import Growth by Region in Per cent

Regions	2008-2013		2011-2013	
	Goods	Services	Goods	Services
Developed countries	0.1	10.3	-0.5	<5
East Asia	43	45	7	14
Latin America	18	28	-4	8
South Asia	35	42	04	5
Sub Saharan Africa	29	22	-3	4
Transition Economies	15	32	6	22
West Asia and North Africa	15	18	30	13

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014) *Key Statistics and Trend in International Trade*. Switzerland: UNCTAD

Analysis of the data as contained in the tables above show, *inter alia*, that developed countries' relative importance as suppliers of international markets is declining. Still, they account for about half of the exports of goods and about 2/3 of the exports of services. As of 2013 world trade in goods was valued at more than US\$18.5 trillion, while trade in services accounted for almost US\$5 trillion. Trade in both goods and services quickly rebounded to reach the pre-crisis levels by 2011. Since then, year-to-year growth rates have been considerably lower. Trade in services has also greatly increased between 2003 and 2013 (from about US\$2 trillion to about US\$4.7 trillion). As of 2013, international trade of both goods and services had completely recovered from the dip of 2009 and largely had surpassed pre-crisis levels.

As of 2013, developed countries' imports of goods reached about US\$ 10 trillion, while that of services added up to US\$ 2.5 trillion. Total exports are of similar magnitude, although the share related to services is sensibly higher. The large majority of developing countries' trade is related to East Asia. In 2013, East Asia traded (imports or exports) close to US\$ 4.5 trillion in goods, and around US\$ 800 billion in services. For other developing countries/regions, especially South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa trade is much lower.

Table 5: Trade shocks of major country groups and major regions, 2004-2015

Year	World	Developed economies	Economies in transition	Developing economies	Least developed countries
2004-2007	1.9	0.9	7.9	4.8	1.2
2009	-2.7	-2.2	-8.8	-3.0	0.3
2010-2011	2.5	1.5	7.3	4.3	1.0
2012	0.5	0.1	1.3	1.1	0.7
2013	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.2
2014-2015	1.2	1.0	0.7	1.6	1.1

Source: UN/DESA, 2013 World Economic Vulnerability Monitor, available from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/publications/wevm.html>.

The implications of these adverse trade relations are better imagined. Presently the situation is not abating as incidence of underdevelopment has continued to worsen in the midst of growing and excruciating economic conditions and palpable decay in social cohesion. Indeed, similar study of Nigeria-U.S. Trade Relations under African Growth and Opportunity Act: An Evaluation in 2006 further revealed the insidious motive of dragging the economy into the neo-liberal orbit which will continue to limit the chances and intensity of re-launching the economy unto the trajectory of stimulating sustainable development. Thus development agenda enunciated and propagated especially by international development agencies naturally end up truncating development enterprise and stifling efforts at reversing the trend (Okolie, 2001; 2006; 2010b; & 2011).

Arising from the above exposition is that poverty is an inevitable outcome of unfair trade practices across the globe. The failure of the WTO and other institutions to promote balanced, fair and mutually beneficial relations among constituent states led to the emergence of the movement for fair trade. **Fair trade** is an organized social movement whose stated goal is to help producers in developing countries to achieve better trading conditions and to promote sustainability. Primarily, it aims at providing better trading conditions that would be rooted in justice, fairness and sound international morality. In fact, fair trade movement aims at achieving the following:

- a. To provide the livelihood and well-being of producers by improving market access, strengthening producer organizations, paying a better price and providing continuity in the trading relationship.
- b. To promote development opportunities for disadvantaged producers, especially women and indigenous people, and to protect children from exploitation in the production process.
- c. To raise awareness among consumers of the negative effects on products from international trade so that they exercise their purchasing power positively.
- d. To set an example of partnership in trade through dialogue, transparency and respect.
- e. To campaign for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international trade.
- f. To protect human rights by promoting social justice, sound environmental practices and economic security (<http://www.waronwant.org/Trade20justice2020fair20>).

The proponents of the above argue that fair trade will enhance trade justice. They maintain that the actualization of the objectives stated above would help developing states to freely choose best policies that will not be undermined by WTO restrictions. However, Sharma (2005:2) correctly noted that “fair-trade primarily helps those who sell their goods abroad. The very poorest farmers produce for local markets, not foreign ones. They are being priced out of those markets by subsidized goods ‘dumped’ by corporations based in rich countries”. This therefore results in the persistence of ‘forced liberalization’ that inherently recreates trade deficits against developing economies (Okolie, 2010a:126). This fundamentally creates global inequality which constantly fans the embers of poverty.

However, poverty is not specifically synonymous with inequality. Indeed, Offiong (2001:97) noted that “whereas poverty is concerned with the absolute standard of living of a part of society, that is, the poor, inequality is the relative living standards across the whole of society”. Fundamentally, poverty affects both the physical and psychological dimensions of man’s existential conditions. Primarily, it disparages the psychological stability and psychic motor and reverberates on the levels of attitudinal and behavioural currents. It demeans innate values of man and dehumanizes him to a level of near irrelevance.

Meanwhile, two models of poverty exist in the literature; they include absolute and relative poverty. The former concerns with economic deprivation in terms of an objective, fixed standard. As stated by Offiong (2001:96), “this implies a level of income that imposes real physical suffering on people in hunger, disease and the massacre of innocent children”. Moreover, absolute poverty refers to the inability of a people to maintain psychical survival on a long-term basis. By relative poverty, we mean the suffering that stems from inequality; it is thus the situation of being economically deprived compared to some other particular groups (Bryjak & Soroka, 1992).

Indeed, poverty can be measured in various ways. Ogboi (2003:19) identified four criteria viz:

- (a) economic criteria measured in terms of income, expenditure and welfare;
- (b) sociological criteria measured in terms of ethnicity, minority group, religion and social status;
- (c) characteristics of household head measured in terms of occupation or employment status; or in terms of the sex of the household head; and
- (d) locational criteria divide an area or region to capture the spatial pattern of inequality and poverty and the effect of public anti-poverty policies.

However, these measures fall into a boiling pot which reduces poverty to a synonym of comparatively low standard of living. Nonetheless, the above criteria are not collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive. There exists a double standard in the “scientific” measurement of poverty. For instance, the World Bank’s one-dollar-a-day criterion applies only to developing states; and in fact both the Bank and the UNDP fail to acknowledge the existence of poverty in Western Europe and North America. In fact, they base their measurement of poverty in the West on minimum levels of household spending required to meet essential expenditure on food, clothing, shelter, health and education (Chossudovsky, 2002). Moreover,

the use of \$1 a day had long come under criticism for seeming arbitrary and using poor quality and limited data thus risking an underestimate of poverty. The \$1.25 a day level is also accompanied by some additional explanations and reasoning, including that it is a common level found amongst the poorest countries and that \$2.50 represents a typical poverty level amongst many more developing countries (Shah, 2009).

Available indices including Table 6 on income and inequality elasticity by region, 1980 to present; Table 7 on human development report, 2014; Table 8 on regional breakdown of number of people living on less than \$1 and \$2 per day, 1990, 1999 and 2015; Table 9 on selected poverty indicators aptly conveyed the poverty trend across states in comparative fashion:

Table 6: Income and inequality elasticity by region, 1980-present

\$1.25 poverty line

Income elasticity	1980s	1990s	2000-present	Overall
Global	-2.427	-2.244	-2.396	-2.335
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)	-2.019	-2.127	-2.397	-2.163
Europe and Central Asia (EECA)	-4.683	-3.499	-3.519	-3.683
Latin America and The Caribbean (LAC)	-2.803	-2.922	-3.016	-2.928
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	-3.029	-3.095	-3.034	-3.062
South Asia (SAS)	-2.031	-2.136	-2.038	-2.055
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)	-1.498	-1.112	-1.359	-1.256

Source: OECD Developed Center, 2014.

Table 7: Human Development Report 2014

Regions	Life expectancy	Mean year of schooling	Expected year of schooling	GNI per capita	HDI - 2012	HDI - 2013	Change in rank
Arab	70.2	6.3	11.8	15,817	0.681	0.682	-1

States							
East Asia and Pacific	74.0	7.4	12.5	10,499	0.699	0.703	-4
Europe and Central Asia	71.3	9.6	13.6	12,415	0.735	0.738	-3
Latin America and the Caribbean	74.9	7.9	13.7	13,767	0.739	0.740	-1
South Asia	67.2	4.7	11.2	5,195	0.586	0.588	-2
Sub Saharan Africa	56.8	4.8	9.7	3,152	0.499	0.502	-3
World	70.8	7.7	12.2	13,723	0.700	0.702	-2

Source: Human Development Report, 2014. Sustainable Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building resilience. New York: UNDP

Notes that data refer to 2012 or the most recent year available. Updated by HDRO based on data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2013b). Data on school life expectancy from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2013a). Based on the estimate of educational attainment distribution from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2013b). Based on cross-country regression. HDRO calculations based on data from the National Institute for Educational Studies of Brazil (2013).

Table 8: Regional breakdown of number of people living on less than \$1 and \$2 per day, 1990, 1999 and 2015 (in millions).

Region	1990	1991	2015	1990	1999	2015
East Asia and the Pacific	452	260	59	1,084	849	284
(excluding China)	92	46	6	285	236	93
Europe and Central Asia	7	17	4	44	91	42
Latin America and the Caribbean	74	77	60	167	168	146
Middle East and North Africa	6	7	6	59	87	65
South Asia	495	490	279	976	1,098	1,098
Sub-Saharan Africa	242	300	345	388	484	597
Total	1,276	1,151	753	2,718	2,777	2,230
(excluding China)	916	936	700	1,919	2,164	2,040

Source: World Development Index (2008) 'Key Indicators'. Retrieved on 24 August 2009 from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/pdf>

Table 9: Selected Poverty Indicators

Selected Poverty Indicators Number (% of the World)	Income Poverty (\$1.25) (millions)	Hunger (millions)	Children Out of School, 2008 (millions)	Adult Illiteracy, 2005-8 (millions)	Living with HIV, 2011 (millions)
Sub- Saharan Africa	376 (31)	234 (28)	28.9 (45)	167.2 (21)	23.5 (77)
South Asia	546.5 (44)	304 (36)	16.9** (26)	412.4 (including West Asia) (53)	2.6* (9)
SSA+SA, Subtotal	922.5 (75)	538 (63)	45.8 (72)	589.6 (75)	26.1 (86)
East Asia	265.4 (22)	232 (27)	7.9 (12)	105.3 (13)	2.4 (8)
Latin America	35.3 (3)	49 (6)	2.9 (5)	36.1 (5)	1.6 (5)
Middle-East and North Africa	8.5 (1)	31 (4)	7.2 (11)	60.2 (8)	0.3 (1)
World	1233.8 (100)	850 (100)	67.5 (100)	795.8 (100)	34.2 (100)

Sources:

Poverty, Sumner, IDS Working Paper 2012

Hunger, FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012, Table 1

School, UNESCO, Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011
 Illiteracy, UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011
 Malaria deaths, WHO World Malaria Report, 2011
 Child Mortality, Levels and Trends in Child Mortality 2012, United Nations
 Maternal Mortality, Trends in Maternal Mortality, 1990-2010, WHO and others
 Sanitation, Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update
 Stunting, State of the World's Children 2012, UNICEF

Selected Poverty Indicators, continued Number (% of World)	Malaria Deaths (000s)	Under-Five Mortality, 2011 (000s)	Maternal Mortality, 2010 (000s)	Lack of Sanitation, 2010 (open defecation), (000s)	Child Stunting, under-5s, 2006-10, (millions)
Sub- Saharan Africa	596 (91)	3,370 (49)	162 (57)	214 (20)	54 (28)
South Asia	20* (3)	2,341 (34)	83 (29)	699 (67)	85 (45)
SSA+SA, Subtotal	616 (94)	5,711 (84)	245 (86)	913 (87)	139 (73)
East Asia and Pacific	23* (4)	590 (9)	23 (8)	103 (10)	28 (15)
Latin America	1 (0)	203 (3)	9 (3)	24 (2)	8 (4)
Middle- East and North Africa	15 (2)	314 (5)	7 (2)	7 (1)	16 (8)
World	655 (100)	6,914 (100)	287 (100)	1,054 (100)	172 (100)


Sources:

Poverty, Sumner, IDS Working Paper 2012
 Hunger, FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012, Table 1
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 Maternal Mortality, Trends in Maternal Mortality, 1990-2010, WHO and others
 Sanitation, Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update
 Stunting, State of the World's Children 2012, UNICEF

When we examine poverty indicators, in Table 9, *Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are the two centres of global poverty* and the two regions demanding the most international support. Of these two regions, sub-Saharan Africa, with lower income than South Asia, faces the greater challenge and need. While the two regions account for approximately 45% of the population of the developing countries, they account for a much higher proportion of poverty in its various manifestations, generally well over 70%:

75% of the income poverty
 63% of the chronically hungry
 72% of the children out of school
 75% of the illiterate adults
 86% of the people living with HIV/AIDS
 94%+ of the malaria deaths
 84% of the Under-5 Mortality
 86% of the Maternal Mortality
 87% of those practicing open defecation
 73% of the stunted children

In addition, the sordid pictures below cited in Okolie (2009c: 23-24) portray the condition of several people constantly being hunted/terrorized by poverty arising from under-development and application of alien and neo-liberal development strategies:



In March 1993, while on a trip to Sudan, Carter was preparing to photograph a starving toddler trying to reach a feeding centre when a hooded vulture landed nearby. Carter reported taking the picture, because it was his "job title" and living. He was told not to touch the children for fear of transmitting disease. He committed suicide three months after winning the Pulitzer Prize.

Picture 2 below vividly demonstrates that water is a scarce resource in major parts of Africa. The picture shows a child washing himself with animal urine.



Picture 3 below shows a sickening image of a child searching for food in the anus of a cow.



Interpretations/Prognosis

The analyses presented so far have practically unfolded the following:

- the trajectories of development and underdevelopment;
- the conditions that make autochthonous development in peripheral capitalist social formations difficult;
- the insidious ideological and intellectual foundation to development gap across the globe;
- the subtle manipulations of symbols, ideas and artifacts to sustain the structure of global political economy;
- transitional rebirth of concepts and circuitous recycling of development cliché to keep the peripheral capitalist states in a near permanent state of **motion without movement**;
- the application of barefoot empiricism to hoodwink the political leaderships and the intelligentsia into dabbling into a near irretrievable state of hallucination and make belief in the task of implanting hope in an obvious situation of hopelessness; and in internalizing the belief that development is akin to global marathon race; and that the future holds greater promise/prospects;
- the tactful decimation of mental faculty of the nationals of developing economies to make them to accept **tales of history without bothering about the history of the historian or to even accept the message without worrying about the intent of the messenger**;
- deliberate whittling down of the academic content and programmes in developing states through conditionalities dished out and served by international donor agencies, thereby hoisting academic content that constantly emphasizes reading without the modicum of human capacity transmogrification; certificates without acquired and internalized skills for positive change;
- provisions of exchange programmes with the fundamental aim of intellectual cloning of individuals/actors from developing economies who must reflect, propagate and advance the precepts of global capitalism and serve as renegades and agents of imperialism and lackeys in their respective countries; and
- subtle imposition of leaders in critical public institutions who spend most of their time shuttling across the globe looking for nothing and pursuing global recognition at the expense of concrete domestic achievements.

Facts of the Matter

- The reality of development conditions across the globe lies in appreciating the politics and demands of societal transformation.
- Global political economy assumes the character given to it by orchestrated or international division of labour, rules of production, distribution and exchange.

- As a system containing different people, with different needs, aspirations and goals, it is expected that multiplicity of communal, local, sub-regional and regional markets with peculiar rules should provide for the needs of these people. It is also expected that specified needs that could not be provided by these decentralized markets should be negotiated by sub-regional and regional markets and not by individual states.
- The idea of pushing for liberalization is fundamentally to whittle down or vitiate the strength of regional markets, thereby exposing individual states to the monstrous manipulations and dictates of the merchants of imperialism.
- More disturbing is that the global market with specialized products for industrialized states has been made an epicentre and compulsory point of convergence for all states irrespective of whether the products they demand is sold there or not. For instance, within the Nsukka environs, *Oye Ibagwa* is a renowned depot for foodstuffs. Any person wishing to purchase electronics would come to *Ogige market*. That is how interaction should be. In global markets, constituent states must be seen to participate, irrespective of their needs. In the event that your needs are not found there, you must be compelled to buy what you do not need, in so far as you drop your foreign exchange (for nothing).
- The currencies for trade, as foisted, are predominantly US dollars, Euros, sometimes Japanese Yen, Pound Sterling and French Franc. Developing states are advised against questioning the propriety of this model of transaction. Worst still, the exchange rate is fixed and manipulated at will to the disadvantage of developing economies. Therefore resources are frittered away on unwanted and irrelevant commodities which at best deplete foreign reserves, weaken local currencies and truncate the development of local content.
- The factors of colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism created false consciousness among the colonized, attuned them to consumption of substandard foreign commodities and imbued in them the penchant for repudiation of their material conditions and state of existence. These factors regenerate a people, cast in one-sided intensity, and who naturally accept the abnormal as following the natural order of existence. These people complain all the time and yet do nothing; they pontificate on their poor state of existence, identify the perpetrators and eventually turn round to glorify, worship and praise them.
- People with different needs scattered within several markets around their respective proximate states, but who choose to abandon these markets in preference to specialized white men's markets, manifest traces of ideological insanity.
- The intensity of liberalizing economies of developing states without reflecting on their implications for autochthonous development is at the root of underdevelopment and proliferation of poverty. In addition, by imbibing ideologization of development

principles, most developing economies have unwittingly elected to be marginalized and to remain on the fringes of extinction.

- Poverty is glorified in most developing economies and hence used as instruments for domination and appropriation. The larger part of the population is locked in absorbing and unending search for stomach infrastructure. Thus, they spend virtually all the time searching for non-existent food and hence worry very little on how their respective political leaderships are plundering public wealth.
- Finally, most political leaders in peripheral capitalist states prefer to keep their respective polities underdeveloped. This is because underdevelopment brings confusion and 'tolerated abuses'. In the midst of these, looting of treasury becomes permissible, and social relations fundamentally vitriolic

Concluding Remarks

The lecture explored the features and structure of global political economy. It interfaced development with underdevelopment and equally explored the intervening variable of undevelopment. It unfolded the indices of development and underdevelopment and proceeded to examine the state. Effort was made to trace the origin, purpose and nature of developed and developing states. Moreover, I interfaced the state and market and noted that the shrinking role of the state is a product of dominance of the marketization principle. The lecture also explored development strategies which are products of the market principles which include privatization, deregulation, commercialization, ideologization of development, Washington Consensus agenda, etc. I noted that the root of development and underdevelopment lies in unequal exchange and distortions arising from the global trade rules and practices. Within this platform, I highlighted impediments in resource-building in developing economies. To break this umbilical cord of underdevelopment, developing states must do the needful, which include:

- ♦ believing in themselves and prioritizing development strategies by refocusing on traditional values;
- ♦ beginning to adopt their unique measurement of poverty and development through the perceptive prism of stomach infrastructure and re-invention of traditional arts and crafts as well as skills development/acquisition processes;

- ♦ providing funds and critical infrastructural support activation and development of new as well as reviving abandoned cottage and small-scale industries;
- ♦ indigenization of technical skills, knowledge base and rewarding inventions, hard work and industry;
- ♦ strengthening the capacity and outreach of communal, intra-communal, intra and inter-state sub-regional and regional markets. These should serve as effective bedrocks for international transactions and negotiations;
- ♦ insisting that the power and sanctity of the ballot boxes are strengthened and preserved. The electoral process should reflect the choices and ideals of the respective states. People must vote and at the same time choose public office holders;
- ♦ taking practical steps towards re-emphasizing production of staple food crops as a step towards developing cash crop potentials;
- ♦ mobilizing internal expertise, skills and endowments for expanding the depth and scope of local content properties through state initiatives and in collaborations with critical domestic national bourgeoisie; and
- ♦ reappraising, reformulating and re-focusing of academic curriculum to reflect domestic needs, local content and localized impact factor properties. Indeed, impact factor content attuned to addressing externalized needs and values is a disguised strategy for advancing academic imperialism and deepening the incidence of self-repudiation, self-delusion and outlandish collective entrapment.

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Vice Chancellor and Chairman, permit me to outline a few of my salient contributions to the study of international political economy in particular and political science in general:

1. In my various writings, I moved beyond the rhetoric of believing that the sub-structure determines the character of the superstructure. This, perhaps, may be applicable to advanced western capitalist economies, but in developing economies with state centric dispositions, the latter remains dominant. Quite often, both variables continue to interrelate and influence each other given the intensity of alignment pattern among the dominant social forces.
2. Again, I unmasked the sense in ideologizing development. Indeed, international development agencies hide under this platform to circulate their lackeys and truncate local content initiatives.
3. Market, marketization and liberalization principles are critical derivatives orchestrated by industrialized countries to institutionalize global inequality. Again, these principles are at the root of poverty template in developing economies.

4. What appears to be market forces as reflected in the demand and supply matrix are indeed seemingly invisible hands of advanced western capitalist states reified by critical international development agencies, international financial institutions, world trade organizations and a few international persons.
5. Poverty is largely a product of unfortunate repudiation of a polity's material existence and acceptance of alien development culture. It is embedded within the ambit of western capitalist development pattern and sustained through the process of universalizing advanced western capitalist development model which repudiates local contents as integral part of a polity's development process.
6. Wholesale participation in global market with virtually no complementarities with articles of trade within the domestic economy provides the platform and foundation for development of underdevelopment.
7. The existence of political corruption is merely a symptom and not the cause of underdevelopment; indeed political corruption signifies that the political leadership lacks the initiative, competence and drive to guarantee effective, efficient and judicious utilization of public wealth for productive purposes.

Appreciations

My Chairman, kindly permit me to end this lecture with a note of appreciations. I must begin by appreciating and thanking the Almighty God for His mercies, blessings and protection all these years. He made me to accept what I could not change; and to discover my talent and destiny. I remain eternally grateful.

To our late father, disciplinarian and ally, Eze Stanislaus Onuabuchukwu Okolie, I say may your humble soul rest in peace. Amen. I do know that your joy will know no bounds today even though you did not live to witness this great event. Our dear and sweet mother, Ezi Nne Lucy Okolie, has remained critical and a unifying factor in our respective families. She not only toiled and sacrificed with our late father to give us quality education but molded us in the image and likeness of God. May God continue to bless and honour you, Mama.

I must not forget to appreciate the contributions of Late Rev. Fr. Prof. L. J. U. Ejiofor, my Ph.D supervisor, who adopted me as his son, and forced me to accept appointment as a lecturer at least for one year, when I already made up my mind to join the National Intelligence Agency. He went further to persuade my parents to accede to this suggestion. 18 years after, I am still awaiting the end of one year to depart. I remain grateful. God shall have mercy on your soul.

I also pay glowing tribute to “our father and earthly (physical) guardian Angel,” Professor Emmanuel Onyebuchi Ezeani. In a world of multiple imperfections, here is a man who should be canonized for living a life of self-abnegation and justice. Sir, your stability of mind; your love for humanity, justice and uncommon humility are sterling qualities that single you out. Please keep the flag flying. Your admirers and disciples are growing in their numbers. I also appreciate the father of the Department, Professor Obasi Igwe. In the midst of turbulence you deploy your wisdom/master stroke and redirect us to the path of rectitude. Thanks for being there for us. Our distinguished and dynamic Head of Department, Professor Jonah Onuoha (Omereoha) is one in a million. Indeed, you are very active, dynamic and professional; the Department, under your able leadership, has come to know peace and justice. Your tsunamic infrastructural transformation of the Department is evident. Please keep the flag flying. To Professor Ken Ifesinachi, I say thank you for forcing me to continue my Ph.D programme. When I was about to depart with my M.Sc certificate, you tactfully goaded me to simply purchase the Ph.D form. Here today, I probably would not have asked for a better glory. I remain grateful for your friendship and for your frank advice.

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